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THE SUBJECT AS FREEDOM

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ERRATA

Page 84, line 19-20, *for* funtional, *read* functional.

„ 113	„ 18	„ felt	„ implicitly felt.
„ 121	„ 11	„ felt	„ explicitly felt.
„ 121	„ 17	„ felt	„ explicitly felt.
„ 185	„ 5	„ so far as	„ so far.
„ 202	„ 22	„ does know	„ does not know

THE SUBJECT AS FREEDOM

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THE SUBJECT AS FREEDOM.

The Notion of Subjectivity.

Object is what is meant, including the object of sense-perception and all contents that have necessary reference to it. Object as the meant is distinguished from the subject or the subjective of which there is some awareness other than the meaning awareness. The subjective cannot be a *meaningless* word: to be distinguished from, it must be a significant speakable and yet if it be a meant content, it would be but object. It can thus neither be asserted nor denied to be a meant content and what cannot be denied need not be assertible. Apparently the significant speakable is wider than the meanable: a content to be communicated and understood need not be meant.

A meaning that is conveyed by a word must be intelligible to the hearer as what he would himself convey by the word. What the speaker means by a word must be capable of being meant by the hearer if he were to use it. The word *this* as used by a speaker means primarily what he perceives ; and although the hearer may use it of some other object, he can use it of the same object. A general term is always understood by the speaker and the hearer to mean the same thing but such identity of the general meaning is possible only because it applies to the same individual thing, the same perceived *this* to both. The word *this* may accordingly be taken as the symbol of the object or what is meant.

The word *I* as used by a speaker is not understood by the hearer to convey what he would himself convey by the use of it. If he used the word, he would intend himself and not the speaker. Actually however when he understands

the word *I* as used by the speaker, he understands it to stand for the speaker. He may accordingly be said to understand the thing intended by the speaker through the word but not through the *meaning* of the word. The thing is not meant by the word for the further reason that the communicating act of the speaker which is never a part of the meaning of a word is itself conveyed by the word *I*. When the object-consciousness of the speaker is communicated, the object and not the speaking of the object is what is understood to be meant. But when his self-consciousness is communicated, it is not his self only but the self as speaking, communicating or expressing itself that is understood. His self-consciousness may in this sense be said to be not merely expressed but *incarnated* in the word *I*. What is here intended by the speaker is not only what the hearer can never intend by the word if he were to use it : it is also the thing-

subject—as *expressing itself* and not as merely expressed. What then is meant and is expressible as *this* is not what is conveyed by the word *I*.

Object as symbolised by the word *this* may be an individual object or a generality. The word *I* as intending the subject is not definitely either singular or general. It is indeed *used* to indicate not only one thing at a time but a thing which cannot be indicated by more than one speaker ; but then different speakers can be *understood* to use it—each of a distinct thing .viz. himself—by the same hearer and understood to use as he would use it. As used, the term has a uniquely singular reference ; but as understood, it is general in the sense the term *unique* is general. It is thus unlike a term meaning an objective content, which has the same reference—singular or general—to the speaker as to the hearer. What is meant by *this* is distinct from what is intended by *I*, though the latter may

be intended or indicated by *this*. The object is not the subject but the subject may be spoken of though not meant as object. The subject may be incarnated in the spoken word *I* which is objective. As incarnated in the object, the subject is the object which yet is distinct from it. In terms of *I* and *this*, we may say that the statement 'this is I' is false while the statement 'I am this' cannot be denied.

If *this* stands for a perceivable object including my body, there is no occasion to make the statement 'this is I' or 'I am this'. But *this* may stand for myself who *spoke* the word *I*; and in answer to the conceivable question 'who is this speaker', I may say 'this is I'. The answer would imply not a judgment but a correction; it would mean 'this speaker is not *this* or object to myself, *this* as distinct from me is here false, the fact being I'. So one may say 'that snake is but a rope' where what is meant

is that the snake is illusory, the rope being the fact. But the statement 'I am this speaker' or 'I said *I*' would not be false in such a context: it would be a mode of expressing what is called personal identity. Nevertheless it is not a judgment: my consciousness of personal identity is not a recognitive judgment as it is ordinarily taken to be. In my answer 'I am this speaker', the predicate does not appear to me, as it appears to the questioner, as what the subject may not be. The pastness of the subject moreover as implied in the predicate—this speaker being I who *spoke*—is not consciously relative to the presentness of the subject. In saying 'I spoke', I make no assertion at all about myself being *now*, the pastness of 'spoke' being consciously distinguished only from the present *objective* situation. The belief in my pastness can never be formulated *by me* as the judgment 'I who am now am I who was then'. It is only another person

who can assert my personal identity in a cognitive judgment. I cannot deny the judgment and may take it as a symbolic expression of my felt belief. My personal identity however is to me only a felt content which though not false is not *asserted* by me. The equation of *I* and *this* is then logically unintelligible, being the rejection of *this* in the form 'this is I' and only a felt content in the form 'I am this.'

The object can be pointed out without the use of a word but it is expressible by the single word *this*. The subject cannot be indicated except by a word and the word for it is not *I* only but any personal pronoun (or any word the use of which is ultimately explained by a personal pronoun). The subject is what is intended by the words *I*, *you* or *he* and though it is always what can call itself *I*, the use of *you* or *he* is as directly intelligible as the use of *I* and need not be explained by it. There is

however a characteristic difference between the first person and the other persons. If *this* means the object, there is no occasion to consciously identify it with *I*, though *I* may be implicitly identified with my body. But *I* am somehow conscious of an identity between another person and his body, conscious of them as distinct and yet one. The relation accordingly of *you* and *he* to *this* and *I* requires closer examination.

You and *he* are to me subjects individualised in the objective body, the body being however as much distinguished from them as from myself. Like their bodies they also can be spoken of as individual, but while the individuality of *he* is evidently derived from his body which is *this* to me, the individuality of *you* appears to be prior to that of your body. You are individual to me primarily through my act of addressing and only secondarily through what appears to my imagination as your identification

with or appropriation of your body. *He* is individual to me only through his body being imagined as identified with or appropriated by him. *This* body is presented to me first through which I apprehend *this* subject or *he*. It may be—though it is not necessary—that before I can address you, I have to apprehend you as *this* subject or *he*; but *this* subject appears to me as *you*, only as I address. To say ‘this is you,’ is to mean in fact that this person is not *this* person, the third person or. *he*: it is to imply a correction as in the statement ‘this is I’. The statement ‘this is he’ however implies a belief though like ‘I am this’, it represents a felt content and not the content of a judgment. My identification of a body presented to me first with the subject *he* is not the knowledge of this object being identical with him, since the object is as much distinct from him as from me though I cannot assert his distinction

from his body. I apprehend the third person as distinct from me, only as I take him to be individualised in his body. Conceived apart from his body, he would be known neither as distinct from me nor therefore as identical with me but only as one who can call himself I; and there would be as little occasion to say of him that he is his body as to say of me that I am my body. The statement 'he is this' is thus excluded but the statement 'you are this' would, like 'this is he', represent a belief that is not knowledge, a felt content that is only symbolised as a judgment. The apprehension of *you* however, logically precedes while that of *he* follows the apprehension of *this* or the body appropriated. There is no occasion to say, as has been explained, either 'this is I' or 'I am this', where *this* stands for my body: and where *this* means a temporal determination of myself, the former represents a correction and the latter a felt and believed content.

Thus of the six possible equations of *this* with *I*, *you* or *he*, three are excluded and the three that are believed viz: 'I am this' (in the sense of myself as then), 'you are this' (your body) and 'this (his body) is he' represent a felt or imagined content that is not known. The object as meant by *this* is known as distinct from the subject as intended by a personal pronoun; and the subject may also be said to be known in itself, being what is either illusorily or imaginatively spoken of as *this* but is not known to be related to *this* either in the way of identity or distinction. The correction implied in the statement 'this is I' indicates the nature of the subject such as it is aware of before it calls itself *I* and incarnates itself in the spoken word. *This* here means myself who spoke and was in the past and the correction is to the effect that the this-ness or pastness is not really mine and only illusorily appears so, that not

this I but the unspecified *I* should be taken as the subject. There is no denial however of the subject being objectifiable as *this* or *then* but the objectification is an incarnation in which the projected objectivity is not known as a determination belonging to the subject, the subject being felt to be dissociated from it. The subject as *you* or *he*, so far as known, is not known as *this* or the appropriated body. You as addressed and conceived to be logically prior to your body are not known by me like your body as distinct from me, being only felt to be the subject that I am distinct from. So too if *his* body is known to be distinct from him and from me, *he* if conceived at all apart from his body is known not as distinct from or identical with me but as only distinct. *You* or *he* are to my knowledge as much unique as what is intended by the word *I*, being in fact understood simply as one who can call himself

I. The three persons are not known to be distinct from or identical with one another.

The object is known as distinct from the subject but the subject is only known in itself and felt to be free or dissociated from the object. I feel dissociated from the object as I feel dissociated from the subject *you* or *he* that appears to me somehow 'identified' with the object. I am aware of alienating you by the fact of addressing and of him being alienated from me as his body is alienated. I actively 'dissimilate' you and therefore also the body that you appropriate and feel unable to 'assimilate' him and therefore his body with which he is found identified. The object in either case is a body somehow one with a subject which I would not or cannot identify with myself. With regard to my own body, I only do *not* feel actually dissociated from it and am not *consciously* identified with it. I am indeed

individualised in my body but I am not introspectively aware of it. I am aware of myself as *this* not in the sense of my body but only in the sense of myself in a temporal position, myself as having been, for example, in the past and having spoken of myself as *I*. *This* is here only thought and not known as distinct from myself and I am conscious not only of being dissociated from it but also of its distinction from myself being illusory. Thus everywhere the subject is known in itself and not as related to the object, being at best felt to be dissociated from the object with which it was identified.

The subject, understood as the unique speaker—actual or possible—of the word *I*, and the object that is meant as distinct from the subject are the two things that are known. The reality of what is meant can always be doubted and so the object is not known with the same assurance as the subject that cannot be

said to be meant. There may be such a thing as an illusory object; and in the statement 'this is I', as already explained, *this* is understood as an objectivity that is annulled. The idea of a possible annulment of objectivity being there, an object that is given as distinct from the subject can be conceived to be not distinct, though the distinction may not be actually cancelled. The denial of reality is intelligible only about what is meant, the negation of the meant being also either actually or problematically meant. The unreality however of the subject as intended but not meant by *I* is meaningless. It is not only inconceivable like the opposite of an axiom; it is not even tried to be conceived, a content being taken to be inconceivable only after it has been tried to be conceived. The word *I* expresses a unique and unanalysable content from which all that is meant is distinct and which yet is understood and unquestioningly believed.

The belief cannot be called a grammatical superstition, though the fact believed is inexpressible except in language by a grammatical pronoun. The subject appears as a known fact, only as it is spoken of through a personal pronoun or conceived to be so speakable. One's private awareness of *I* before its expression in speech is indeed knowledge but the *I* here does not appear as a known fact distinct from the knower. To be aware of the subject as a known fact is to be aware of it as a spoken fact. It is not so about the object of which one may be aware as known even if unnamed. The subject as spoken fact is however a meant fact.

The metaphysical controversy about the reality of the subject is only about the subject viewed in some sense as object. The thinnest sense in which it is objectified is being taken as meant. Ordinarily the validity of this degree of objectification of the subject is not questioned, nor therefore the possibility of a dispute about its reality. If however the subject is taken, as explained, to be what is expressed by the word *I* as expressing itself, it is not meant or at best meant as unmeant and is accordingly above metaphysical dispute. There is properly no metaphysic of the subject, if by metaphysic is understood an enquiry into the reality conceived as meanable. Even the unknowable thing-in-itself of Spencer and Kant is not taken to be unmeanable. It is at worst taken to be a problem in meaning. The knowable is meant and the negation of the knowable is, if not meant, tried to be meant, being not a gratuitous combina-

tion of words but a believed content that is problematically formulated. The subject which is also believed is formulated as *I* which is however understood as unmeanable though not as a mere word like *abracadabra*. The understanding here is not a mystic intuition though it may point to its possibility, nor the intuition of a meaning that can be a term of a judgment, nor yet the thought of a meaning that is not known because not intuited or that is known without being intuited. It is somewhere midway between a mystic intuition and the consciousness of a meaning, being the believing awareness of a speakable content, the negation of which is unmeaning and which therefore is not a meaning. What is claimed to be mystically intuited is speakable only in metaphor which presents a contradiction in meaning and what is affirmed or denied in metaphysic is a meanable. The subject as *I* is neither contradictory

nor meanable and the exposition of it accordingly is intermediate between mysticism and metaphysic. As however the subject is communicable by speech without metaphor, it cannot be taken as falling outside philosophical enquiry.

The attitude of metaphysics like that of the sciences including psychology is objective. It seeks to know reality as distinct from the knowing of it, as objective at least in the sense of being meant. Knowing as a fact from which the known is distinct is not properly the subject either of psychology or of metaphysics. Psychological introspection is at best awareness of the *known-ness* of the object, the known-ness being meant as an accident of the object, as an abstraction from the known object, as the difference between the object as known and the object that is only believed, or as the object *coming* to be known. If there be a metaphysic of the psychological fact of known-ness,

its problem would be to determine what it is in the object that makes it known and not what the subject should be in order that it may know. Knowing from which all that is known or objective is distinct is dealt with in epistemology which distinguishes it as a function from the object but does not therefore take it to be a known fact. Knowing is not given as distinct to introspection nor inferred as distinct, being only distinct through the self-conscious act of distinguishing it. Knowing cannot be known as a fact unless the distinguishing of knowing be the knowing itself, unless in fact the distinctness of the knowing from the distinguishing of it appears illusory, even as *this* appears illusory in the apparent judgment 'this is I'. To realise that the distinctness of knowing is entirely through the distinguishing of it is to realise knowing as a self-evidencing fact, as not distinct from the object known

but as unrelated or illusorily related to it, as not the knowing *of* object but as the solitary fact of the subject itself. . Knowing is not thus known in epistemology which however does not disbelieve in its facthood. Were it known as a meanable fact, there would be room for the metaphysical inference of the subject as the ground of it. As it is, knowing is only symbolised as an activity; and the inference of the subject as the agent is rightly characterised as involving a grammatical superstition. There is no room for metaphysics after epistemology has worked itself out of the objective attitude of metaphysics and the sciences by distinguishing knowing from the object known.

At the same time the belief in the facthood of knowing is there, as epistemology is not an enquiry into the significance of the mere phrase 'knowing *of* object'. The belief is in the facthood of the knowing function, function being

a metaphor for a positive something which is literally expressed only in the negative way as what the known object is not and being thus not even an accomplished meaning. The awareness of this unmeant something involves however a higher certitude than the belief in the meant object. Epistemology claims this certitude though it cannot justify it and has to recognise it to be other than the certitude of knowledge. Thus it appears that while the subject can be said to be known by itself and the meant object to be known as distinct from the subject, a subjective function like knowing is only believed though it may be with greater assurance than the object. The knowing of an object is not given as distinct from the object and is only in being distinguished from it, as relating and not as related to it, as not distinct from the distinguishing but not therefore as identical with it, as the free reference of the subject to the

object. The subject is, as explained before, free from the object in the sense of being known by itself and not as related to it either in the way of identity or distinction. The knowing function represents a positive mode of this freedom, the freedom of the subject to relate to object without getting related to it, which is believed to be more certain than the object but is not known. We are aware of knowing a content when it is formulated and believed to be independent of our formulating, speaking or distinguishing act. It is so believed when it is felt either to be a given distinct—as in the case of the object known—or to be ‘incarnated’ in the formulation in the sense explained of being expressed as expressing or self-revealing—as in the case of the subject. Subjective function or the positive freedom of the subject to refer to the object is felt to be neither and is accordingly said to be only believed. The belief is

bound up with the knowledge of the self-evidencing subject and as belief in a content which is like the subject itself not presented as meant, it is incapable of being doubted and is more certain than the knowledge of a meant object.

The three believed contents—the subject, the positive freedom of the subject and the meant object—are all speakable and it is from the speakable that we have to start in philosophy. The subject is taken to be known, as one who says *I* is immediately understood by the hearer through the word but not as meant by the word. The speaker is understood as revealing himself to another of whom he is positively aware as distinct but not as independent of his distinguishing. The positive awareness may be called feeling of alienating the subject *you*. What is known is the body of the other subject as an object distinct from the speaker. The speaking subject may

thus be said to have a feeling of relating itself to the object, of addressing itself to it as though it were *you*. This felt relating is the positive freedom of the subject having different felt modes like, knowing, feeling or being which though not objectively meanable can be symbolised by objective meanings. Such symbolic elaboration of the felt or believed spiritual functions would be a procedure of philosophy intermediate between the recognition of the subject purely through the intention of the word *I* and the inferential inquiry into the reality behind the meant object which is called metaphysics.

There is properly no metaphysic of the subject and the apparent problems about the existence of the subject and its relation to the object are really illegitimate. The question if the subject is real is unmeaning, for the subject as *I* is not a meaning. The reality of the subject is known in the direct under-

standing of the word *I* as used by a speaker, which is neither the understanding of its meaning nor a mystic intuition of an unspeakable content. There can be also no relation of subject to object if the subject is not objectively meant, the subject being only aware of its function of *relating* or referring to object. The subject may believe itself and the object without speaking of them but it believes its relating function only as it speaks of it. If it speaks of the object, it believes in it as meant and if it speaks of itself as *I*, it believes in it as unmeant. But in speaking of its function it believes in it neither as meant nor as unmeant but as being constructed as fact by being spoken. A believed content that is spoken appears objective but while the appearance is denied of the spoken subject and asserted of the spoken object, it is only not denied of the spoken function. The speaking creation of a system of subjective

functions or the symbolising elaboration of the positive freedom of the subject constitutes a special study which as not asserting meanable and justifiable truth cannot be called metaphysic and as yet inviting to believe and exhibiting the interval between the self-evidencing I and objectively knowable truth has to be taken as coming within philosophy.

There is no theoretic passage from what is meanable or objectively knowable to the subjectively knowable I; metaphysics cannot pass out of the region of meanings. Epistemology indeed deals with the subjective function behind the accomplished meaning but it does not assert it as fact. It *assumes* the facthood of the function—knowing *of* object—and only paraphrases the intention of the preposition *of* in reference to the different modes of knownness of the object such as are presented in psychology. The facthood of the knowing function and of subjective function

in general is believed though not known and is elaborated into a system of symbolisms in a new philosophical study which may be called spiritual or transcendental psychology. The symbolism is fact in the sense of being the form of the non-theoretic or spiritually practical mode of escaping the objective knowing attitude of which the meaning attitude represents the subtlest stage. No meanable truth is self-evidencing, its negation being at least a problem in meaning and yet the self-evidencing I is the type of truth. The implication is that meanable truth which cannot be denied to be truth has to be realised as self-evidencing, not by being objectively thought again but by the spiritual cultivation of a subjective attitude. As the positive freedom of relating—which is an objective attitude—is to the objectively meant relation, so is the negative freedom in the cultivation of the subjective attitude to the positive free-

dom of the objective attitude. Spiritual psychology symbolises the subjective attitude by the objective attitude from which it seeks to be freed. The modes of subjectivity are the modes of freeing oneself from the modes of objectivity.

Hence comes the justification of the name spiritual *psychology*. Psychology, as has been pointed out, deals not properly with knowing but with knownness as a character or aspect of the object. It deals, as we may say generally, not with subjective function but with the object regarded explicitly as distinct from it, as known, felt or willed. If there be a metaphysic of psychology, its problem would be what there is in the object to make it known, felt or willed. We are aware of an object that was only believed as coming to be known though its existence is not asserted or denied before the knowing. The metaphysical problem about the objective knownness, feltness etc. is intelligible though it may not be

capable of objective solution. The distinguishing of knownness etc. as an abstraction from the object, as the objectivity of the object is what is called psychological introspection. The distinguishing of the subjective function of knowing etc. as other than this abstraction of objectivity may also be called introspection and it may be, with greater right. If psychological introspection be an abstracting from the object, this introspection is a creative symbolising, the functions being subjective facts and not mere abstractions, though they are only believed and not known. The symbolising of the subjective function is by a mode of objectivity like known-ness, dissociation from which is precisely indicated by the word function. Thus the functions represent the modes of freedom from the corresponding psychological abstractions. The consciousness of freedom is as direct as that of such abstraction and its content can only be indicated as some sort of negation of

the abstraction. If the consciousness of the abstraction be called psychological introspection, the consciousness of freedom may be called spiritual introspection and the philosophical study that is based on it may be designated spiritual psychology.

The metaphysical problem—what it is in the object that determines its known or felt appearance—assumes that an appearance of object that is not unreal is caused by object, which implies further that object has an assured reality independent of the subject. It has however been indicated that the reality of object is not incapable of being doubted like the reality of the subject; and even if object be as real as the subjective process that refers to it, it is not necessary that its relatedness to the subject should be caused at all. The emergence of such relatedness of an object is an event in time, only so far as it is not other than the emergence of the object or of an objective situation comprising it. The

knownness or feltness of an object is an abstraction, the problem of the causation of which is illegitimate. Change in the object, as distinguished from the object, is also an abstraction but it is still understood as objective fact though unseparated from the object. Known-ness etc. or the objectivity of the object is an abstraction that has no objective meaning at all by itself and about which therefore the demand for causal explanation is meaningless. The explanation of the emergence of the object *as related* to the subject is an ordinary objective or scientific problem and no separate explanation can be demanded for the emergence of the abstraction of relatedness. The metaphysical problem is thus apparently only a problem in meaning—how relatedness to the subject can be spoken of as a character of the object.

Spiritual psychology however has a place because its business is not to explain or to solve a problem. Its business

is in the first place to interpret empirical psychology in terms of the positively felt and believed freedom of the subject from objectivity; and next to elaborate modes of freedom that have no reference to object at all, to conceive the possible illusoriness of all objects and thus to assign an intelligible place to what is ordinarily scouted as spiritual mysticism. In the objective attitude, the known-ness or felt-ness of the object appears positive and knowing or feeling appears as its problematic negation. In the subjective attitude, the case is reversed: freedom is positively believed and the relatedness of the object to the subject—its objectivity—appears as constructed, as not belonging to the object in the sense change belongs to it and is thus understood as the self-negation or alienated shadow of the subject. In the objective attitude again, *this* or object appears to exist beyond its *this-ness* or relatedness to the subject, while in

the subjective attitude not only is the transcendent *this* rejected as meaningless, *this-ness*—meaning the so-called psychological entities, known-ness or feltness—appears also not to be *given* as distinct to introspection but to exist only as distinguished or constructed, this distinguishing or constructing being felt as less certain than the self-evident subject behind it. The object or *this* beyond objectivity, *this-ness* or relatedness to subject is sought to be known not only in the metaphysic of psychology, but in all metaphysic. From the standpoint of spiritual psychology, this transcendent object is simply meaningless and metaphysic is the quest of a chimera. All so-called metaphysical problems are to it symbolisms for modes of freedom, the forms of spiritual discipline by which the objective attitude has to be renounced and the positive subjective functioning has to be reversed in direction towards the realisation of the subject behind it.

Kant's critical philosophy may be taken as a disguised form of spiritual psychology as thus conceived. The elaboration of the three modes of belief—theoretic, practical and aesthetic is transcendental psychology, the spiritual equivalent offered by him for dogmatic metaphysic. The start is from epistemology which assumes the reality of the subject and subjective function though it does not explicitly confess in the case of the knowing function that it is only assumed or believed to be real and presents instead a makebelieve of inference in the so-called transcendental deductions. The other functions are however definitely asserted to be only believed: the reality of the willing function, for example, is taken to be apprehended in the willing consciousness only. The confession is not made about the knowing function because epistemology is to Kant not so much a branch of transcendental psychology as a prolegomena to it, concerned

not with the presentation of subjective fact but with the meaning of the preposition *of* in 'knowledge of object', the facthood of which is implicitly taken for granted. Its interest is still in the object, in the known-ness or objectivity of the object which it seeks to understand theoretically as knowing. It does not abandon the objective procedure of metaphysic and the sciences, even though it sets itself to correct the conceit of independent objectivity. The objective procedure may be necessary to show up the seamy character of objectivity and may also imply the truthful admission that we do not get rid of our actual belief in the independent object by the mere thinking criticism of it. But it misleads so far as it presents the function as an objective meaning and does not recognise that it is believed without being meant. Epistemology might be mistaken as only a philological study, unless it is consciously viewed as rooted in the faith in the facthood of

the knowing function and unless the so-called deduction that it presents is definitely known to be not inferential and not literally meant but to be the mere symbolisation by logical form of what is immediately believed as spiritual fact.

The persisting objective attitude of Kant in his first critique explains not only his admission of the thing-in-itself and his denial of self-knowledge but also his disbelief in the possibility of a spiritual discipline of the theoretic reason through which self-knowledge may be attainable. From the subjective standpoint, object beyond known-ness, *this* beyond *this-ness* is, as explained, meaningless. It may be that wedded as we are to our body, we cannot get rid of the objective attitude and the tendency to look beyond the constructed object to the purely given. But not to be able to deny need not imply admission and though the Kantian disclaimer of idealism as accomplished knowledge is intelligible,

his admission of the unknowable reality appears to be an unwarrantable surrender to realism. After the resolution of the objectivity of the object into the knowing function, the independence of the object becomes inconceivable though it continues to be believed. Such a belief cannot be asserted though it cannot also be rejected. Realism should therefore be held as suspect though idealism is only a faith and not knowledge. But the faith has to be cherished and there should be a subjective discipline to get rid of the persisting realistic belief. Kant does not admit such a discipline at least for the theoretic reason.

Self-knowledge is denied by Kant: the self cannot be known but only thought through the objective categories—unity, substantiality etc. there being no intuition of it. The view presented so far is that the subject is known though neither thought (meant) nor intuited. It is known as what the speaker of *I*

is understood to intend by it. The understanding is a direct believing in something that is not meant but revealed as revealing itself, a question about the reality of which does not arise and is unmeaning. The subject is thus known by itself, as not meant but speakable and not as either related or relating to the object. It is however believed as relating to object and symbolised as such by the objective relations. The modes of relating are at the same time the modes of freeing from objectivity, the forms of the spiritual discipline by which, it may be conceived, the outgoing reference to the object is turned backwards and the immediate knowledge of the *I* as content is realised in an ecstatic intuition.

Spiritual progress means the realisation of the subject as free. The realisation may or may not involve a specific activity of the subject. There are those to whom it is only a resultant

experience. One lives an objectively good or full life and finds his self correspondingly realised. Others however recognise a specific discipline or consecutive method of activity for such realisation. The consciousness of perfection, freedom or salvation as the end is to them a demand for some kind of activity of the subject towards itself. This cult of the subject, as it might be called, takes various forms but they all involve a feeling of dissociation of the subject from the object, an awareness of the subject as what the object is not. The specific activity demanded is primarily in the *inwardising direction and secondarily, if at all, in the direction of creating objective or social values. One demand among others—all being absolute demands—is that the subjective function being essentially the knowing of the object as distinct from it, this knowing which is only believed and not known as fact has to be known as fact,

as the self-evidencing reality of the subject itself. This would be the cult of the subject *par excellence*, a spiritual discipline of the theoretic reason, a method of cognitive inwardising, the possibility of which as indeed of any method of realisation is not ordinarily recognised.

The possibility of such a method has to be exhibited in spiritual psychology. A method implies a series of consecutive steps for the realisation of an end. The steps in this case should correspond to a gradation of subjective functions, of modes of freedom from the object. Identified as we are³ with our body, our freedom from the perceived object is actually realised only in our bodily consciousness, though even this, as will appear later, is only imperfectly realised. Bodily consciousness may as well be called conscious body, there being no dissociation at this stage of the subject from the body, though the extra-organic

object is known to be distinct from it. The next stage of freedom is suggested by the distinction of the perceived object including the body from the ghostly object in the form of the image, idea and meaning which may be all designated presentation. Consciousness as undissociated from such presentation, but dissociated from the perceived and felt body may be called presentational or psychic subjectivity. The dissociation of the subject or consciousness from this presentation conceived as a kind of object would be the next stage of freedom which may be called non-presentational or spiritual subjectivity. The three broad stages of subjectivity would then be the bodily, the psychical and the spiritual and each would comprise sub-stages. Wedded as we are to our body, actual freedom is felt only in bodily subjectivity and freedom in the higher stages as suggested by psychology is believed not as what is actual but

as what has to be achieved or realised. The grades of subjectivity imply grades of objectivity, the terms being conceived in a relative sense. To spiritual subjectivity, the psychical is objective and so to psychic subjectivity, the bodily and to bodily subjectivity, the extra-organic is objective. The objective at any stage is known as distinct from the subjective next to it, which however is not known as distinct from the objective but only felt and believed to be free or dissociated from it. The elaboration of these stages of freedom in spiritual psychology would suggest the possibility of a consecutive method of realising the subject as absolute freedom, of retracting the felt positive freedom towards the object into the pure intuition of the self.

II. Psychic Fact.

The facts of empirical psychology have to be interpreted from the subjective standpoint in spiritual psychology. What is called psychological introspection is apparently a process of abstraction from the object of its modes of relatedness to the subject. This relatedness, viewed as a character of the object, is the so-called psychic fact. There is a difference however between this objective character and other objective characters. A character of a thing is an abstraction distinguished from it but not imaginable as separated from it. As distinct *in* the thing, it is fact but as spoken of by itself, it need not mean a fact. An abstraction like colour, for example, means a fact while an abstraction like intensity does not mean a fact though the intensity of colour as in the colour is a fact. These two kinds of abstraction may be designated respectively as of the

first degree and of the second degree. Known-ness or any other mode of relatedness of object to subject, as taken by itself, is an abstraction of the second degree: it does not mean a fact though the object as thus related is fact. There is a difference again between this relatedness and intensity as abstractions. In the knowing of a bright colour, colour is not known as distinct from brightness, being only spoken of as distinct while in the knowing of the known-ness of an object, the object—at least as non-perceptually known—is known as distinct from its known-ness or presentation. Known-ness or relatedness is a floating adjective of the object like its beauty or like the absence of an object as a character of the object in which it is absent. The so-called psychic fact, as abstracted from the object by psychological introspection, may thus be taken as a floating abstraction of the second degree. It is inter-

preted from the subjective standpoint in spiritual psychology as a subjective function that is a fact.

To psychological introspection with its objective attitude, psychic fact is a character of the object, existing like the object even apart from introspection. It is however only quasi-objective: unlike the object which when not perceived is known to exist in some other mode of cognition, psychic fact that is believed during introspection to exist is believed on the testimony of the same introspection to exist also apart from it. The perception of an object is immersed in the object and as such is not, as will appear later, knowable in direct introspection. As the object is only indirectly known to be distinct from the perception of it, perception cannot be taken as a given psychic fact for purposes of psychology. Feeling again is a psychic fact only as the feltness of a known object and as bound up with its known-

ness ; and if there is feeling not bound up with object-cognition, it cannot appear to introspection to exist apart from it and as such cannot be called psychic fact. To start with at any rate then, the term *psychic* has to be restricted to modes of subjectivity that lie between sense-perception on the one hand and such objectless feeling on the other.

Psychic fact is either the known-ness of object or the feltness etc. of known object, being fact from which object is distinguishable. What does not involve the knowledge of object is no psychic fact. Is mere imagination then—imagination of the *imaginary* which is no known object—to be regarded as psychic fact? What is imagined need not be imaginary and even what is taken as imaginary is not wholly imaginary. The imagination of a golden mountain involves not only the awareness of what never is but also the belief in the possibility of a mountain being made of gold, in

the compatibility of the objective facts, *golden* and *mountain*. This compatibility is not imaginary, is not merely an imagined relation of two images but is an objective fact expressed in an abstract and periphrastic way. The imagination of golden mountain is a psychic fact so far as it implies an unrejected belief in such objective fact.

But is the awareness of the content as what never is to be taken as psychic fact? The belief in the absence of what is at some time somewhere is still knowledge of objective fact. Even the awareness of what never is, where there was wrong belief in it or a real question about it, implies an unrejected belief in some objective fact. But golden mountain is imaginary in the sense that it not only never is but that it does not even suggest a real question about its existence. The awareness of such an imaginary content implies the rejection of all belief in

objective fact. Introspection is belief in the psychic fact of believing in an objective fact. Is there a belief in the absence of objective belief or in other words introspection into the consciousness of the imaginary? There may only be disbelief or no-belief in believing and so there seems to be no introspection into *mere* imaging, the awareness of it being other than though on a level with introspection. What introspection does not reveal is no psychic fact and hence the consciousness of the imaginary is no psychic fact.

Is there such a thing as objectless feeling, feeling that does not involve knowledge of an objective fact? The feeling that we introspectively believe as being a fact outside introspection is the feeling of an object as known, from which indeed the knowledge is distinguished but which is not itself distinguished from the knowledge. Objectless feeling, if such there be, would be

like introspection itself only a non-psychic fringe of some psychic fact. The general possibility of such feeling will be exhibited later but it may be asked at this stage if the feeling of an object that is believed to be illusory should be taken as psychic fact. The past belief in the snake, for example, which is now known to be only a rope, was bound up with a feeling of fear. Is the fear now believed as a past psychic fact? Obviously we do not believe it now as the fear of *that* snake. But it may be said that although *that* snake is not believed, the characteristic feeling of bodily reaction in the past is believed, which is just the past fear of the snake. A feeling however is essentially individual and its individuality is constituted by the belief in the individuality of its object. The reduction of what was taken to be the fear of snake to the feeling of bodily reaction would be the disbelief in *that* feeling. Belief

in the past fear of some object indeed remains over with the belief in the past bodily condition. But it remains over only in the sense of not being rejected and not of being asserted and it remains over not by itself but as only the non-psychic fringe of the memory of the past bodily condition.

When we speak of the feeling of an object, we are not introspectively aware of the feeling as distinct from and accompanying the belief in the object. We do not distinguish the feeling at all from the belief though we may be aware of the belief without the feeling. The feeling infact refers to the object as directly as the belief and along with it. It is artificial to understand it to refer to the object by being in the first instance related to the belief in the object and therefore to take the fear of the snake now believed to be illusory as fear related to the past belief in snake as distinct from the snake. We

cannot say that the fear of the snake was just as real as the past belief in the snake. The false belief, now that it is corrected, is known to have been a fact, for the correction can be expressed in the form 'what *was believed* to be snake was not snake but rope.' It cannot be said however about the fear that it was fear of the rope or of *that* snake or of that idea of snake or that it was fear of nothing at all. The rope was the cause but not the object of the past feeling; so too was the idea of the snake while *that* snake cannot be called its object because it is now disbelieved. Nor can we take the object to have been snake-in-general, for fear of such a generality is at best a disposition to feel and not an actual feeling. We believe indeed in the past feeling of a characteristic bodily reaction but a bodily feeling is not the consciousness of the body as its object, there being as little conscious distinction

between bodily feeling and felt body as between perception and perceived object, while the past feeling in this case was distinctly consciousness of something as object. We cannot say that that the fear was of nothing at all, since we do not remember the feeling as unformulated. After the belief in the snake has been corrected, it is impossible to describe as past *fact* what was called fear of the snake when it was believed. It may be arbitrary to deny that the fear was a fact but it cannot be asserted to have been fact because its object is now indescribable. The feeling then of an object now believed to be illusory cannot at least be asserted to have been a psychic fact.

A psychic fact involves belief in an objective fact and introspection into it is a belief in such belief. The awareness of the imaginary as such, being a disbelief in objective belief, has been shown to be other than but on a level with

introspection. Are these modes of subjectivity to be taken as psychic facts? A psychic fact may involve belief in another psychic fact but it is primarily a belief in some objective fact. One may remember for example an objective event and also be aware of the subjective fact of its having been previously known. Such awareness is not memory unless the past knowing of the event was itself known in the past and should be taken accordingly as nothing but introspection. It is no psychic fact by itself but is only the transitive fringe of the substantive fact of objective memory. Introspection is always awareness of a psychic fact that is past though the psychic fact need not be known as past as in this case and may persist at the time of introspection. In any case introspection into it is bound up with another psychic fact like memory as in this case, which is primarily a belief in the object and need not

have this fringe. Like introspection which is belief in believing, disbelief in believing also—the consciousness of the imaginary, which is not introspection but may be taken as coordinate with it—is a non-psychic fringe of a substantive psychic fact. The correction of an objective illusion appears to present a difficulty, since in it we are aware not of the past object but of the past belief in object, the awareness being also introspection. It implies however a present disbelief in the object which as implying in every case an unrejected belief in something objective is psychic fact and the introspective belief in the past fact of belief is the non-psychic fringe of this psychic fact.

So then we conclude that a form of consciousness which does not involve belief in an objective fact is no psychic fact but is only the fringe of some psychic fact that involves such belief and need not have the fringe. The fringe

may epistemologically be primary or secondary in respect of the psychic fact but never stands by itself. Introspection for example is primary in respect of the psychic fact of which it is a fringe while the awareness of an illusory object is secondary in respect of the belief that remains over after the correction. Again the individual feeling that cannot be denied as bound up with the past belief in the object that is now taken to be illusory is primary in respect of the remembered body-feeling and may be taken as secondary in respect of the present remembering of the bodily feeling.

A psychic fact is or involves not merely the belief in an objective fact but the knowledge of it. We are aware of a belief as having been belief in an object as now formulated if the object is now either known or disbelieved. It is in introspection into knowledge or in the consciousness of the unreal object as such that we realise that we believed

before we knew or disbelieved and that there was then no awareness of a distinction of the object believed from the belief. Knowledge as distinct from mere belief involves awareness of the distinction, this being testified by introspection into knowledge even about such knowledge as precedes introspection. The distinction that is presented to introspection is believed to exist also apart from introspection. The distinction of the object from the belief in it is something more than the object itself, though it cannot be said to be not objective. It is just what is called presentation of the object, which is taken as a psychic fact only as it is in introspection abstracted from the object. Presentation and object are so related that while the latter is given distinct from the former, the former is not given distinct from the latter, being only abstracted or tried to be distinguished in introspection.

Two extreme cases have to be considered in understanding this relation of presentation and object. In perceptual knowledge, the object does not appear distinct from its presentation; and in perceptual illusion, there is apparently the presentation only, with no object distinct from it. We do not indeed introspectively distinguish perceptual knowledge from its object but still such knowledge is not mere belief inasmuch as in it the object is given as distinct in itself though not from its presentation and has not to be distinguished, as in the case of mere belief, in a later act of knowledge. The object explicitly appears distinct from its presentation in non-perceptual knowledge, such distinction being the condition of possible introspection into it. There is accordingly no introspection into perceptual knowledge, though other knowledge when introspected into, may be distinguished from perceptual knowledge. Still

the perceived object being consciously distinct in itself may be distinct from its presentation, though it is not consciously so appreciated. Knowledge involves only the conscious or evident distinctness of the believed object, whether or not there is the consciousness of the presentation as that from which it is distinct.

Perceptual illusion presents another kind of difficulty. The perceived object being disbelieved is not removed altogether from consciousness. The appearance may be still presented though such presentation would not embody belief in an object. Like mere imagination, mere perceptual presentation is no psychic fact at all to which object may be related in the way of distinction: the awareness of it is only the fringe of perception as a fact. In the correction of an illusion as expressed in 'not snake but rope', the rope is utterly unrelated to the mere presentation: the

word *not* in it means rejection only and no distinction, the rejection being the fringe of the present perception of rope. The awareness of the mere presentation is not belief in it, though unlike mere imagination the presentation is not explicitly disbelieved. The mere presentation as this equivocal something that is neither believed nor disbelieved is very different from the presentation from which the object is said to be distinct in knowledge and which is definitely believed in introspection and taken to embody belief in an object. It should in fact be designated by some word other than presentation.

Intermediate between perceptual knowledge and perceptual illusion are the other forms of knowledge involving a conscious distinction of the known object from its presentation. It is in the awareness of the illusory that the presentation definitely emerges from the perceived object into which it was mer-

ged. But this emergence or freedom is also the death of the presentation in the sense that it no longer embodies belief. The presentation is a fact to introspection so long as the object presented is believed and distinguished from it. Introspection into non-perceptual knowledge is thus a belief in presentation. As introspection is the belief that its content is a fact even apart from introspection, the presentation is a fact, the facthood of which consists in its being a belief in a distinct objective fact. As there is no direct introspection into perceptual knowledge, there is no consciousness here but not therefore a denial of a presentation from which the object is distinct. Introspection into non-perceptual knowledge is such consciousness of presentation of object from which object is distinct.

The distinctness of the object from its presentation does not mean the distinctness of the presentation from its

object. The introspective belief in the presentation is belief in the object as well and so presentation is not not-objective, not illusory nor purely subjective. As the object however is distinguished from it in non-perceptual knowledge, it is the perceivable object and something more that is believed in, something that is not known but is wanted to be known. The knowledge of the distinction of the object as imagined to be perceived from the presentation is the belief embodied in presentation in something that cannot be imagined to be perceived but appears still as adjectival to the perceivable object. This believed something is, if known, known as unknown and as only wanted to be known.

There are different grades of non-perceptual knowledge implying different modes of presentation or belief in object. By perception is meant here external perception of object. What is the knowledge of the body from within, body as inter-

nally felt and not externally observed ? The observed object including the observed body is distinguished from the internally felt body which thus is no part of the observable world and yet is believed not as other than the observed body but as its character of internality. Again there is the immediate apprehension of the absence of an object which can not be said to be known by external perception at least in the ordinary sense and yet is known as a present objective fact. There is memory which is belief in the perceivable object as past, pastness being an unperceivable character of the object. Imagination so far as it involves belief is non-perceptual apprehension of the object as forming or becoming formed to be a perceptible object. Inference again is belief in the perceivable object as involving the unperceivable character of necessity. None of these non-perceptual forms of apprehension is mere belief ; the object cannot be said

to be not known in them and yet each is a belief in something that cannot be known by external perception and being still about the object and indefinite is wanted to be somehow known or realised. Perceptual knowledge is the actual standard of knowledge. The other modes of apprehension imply it, are not taken in introspection to be mere belief and involve further a belief in something not yet known but which may be known in some ideal mode of realisation or intuition.

Perception as the actual standard of knowledge not only lends the cognitive character to the other modes of apprehension but also prevents them from reaching their ideal completion. The internality of the felt body, absence or pastness, forming or necessity as facts are wanted to be known as the object is actually known in perception. Yet these are facts of such a kind that if they were so known, the perception of the

object could not remain unaffected in its cognitive character. So far as these modes of apprehension are knowledge, they are knowledge of these facts as adjectival characters of the perceptually knowable object. These facts however, as shown about the general character of known-ness, are floating adjectives from which the object to which they are ascribed are distinct though as abstractions of the second degree, they have to be referred adjectivally to the object as substantive. They are however necessarily symbolised as substantive by objective metaphors, being not merely thought but sought to be believed as though they were substantive objects. If they could be known as such, the actual perceived object would be at best a particular manifestation of a more essential object. They are however not known as substantive and there is only the metaphysical *aspiration* to extend and deepen the conception of the object.

They are not known because as a matter of fact though not necessarily we are wedded to the body and to the perceptual object that is organic to it. The identification with the object is so deep-rooted that though not necessary, it is not annulled by any logic and may be regarded for all ordinary purposes as a 'permanent illusion'.

The believed object as perceived or imagined to be perceived is distinct from presentation but the presentation is not distinct from its object. In perceptual knowledge, if the object is not consciously distinct from its presentation, its distinction is yet knowable through some ordinary non-perceptual mode of knowledge. But if the presentation is not known as distinct from the object, it does not come to be known as such by any logic or in any ordinary form of knowledge. It is believed and symbolised as what should be distinct: the distinction here, not being a character of the object, cannot exist

unconsciously. It can exist only in being achieved or realised subjectively. The psychic fact, being essentially presentation as embodying belief, is on the one hand not imaginary or non-factual and on the other not accomplished as fact but only to be accomplished. It is at once known and unknown, its facthood being what has begun to be achieved and is yet to be completed. Introspection is belief in the psychic, not as utterly unknown but as only not isolated or freed from objective fact. The complete knowledge and facthood of the psychic has to be achieved by such isolation but the demand itself is roused by such knowledge as has already begun.

Psychic fact involves knowledge of object and such knowledge exists outside introspection as presentation from which object is distinct but which is not distinct from the object. Presentation is the object and more than the object, embodying as it does belief in something that can never be perceived by sense, from which the perceived object is distinct but which yet appears as a character of the object. As such, this presentation may be said to be known as unknown and as to be known and has to be symbolised as object, including as it does the object as its manifestation or appearance in some sense. Psychic fact accordingly is that of which the facthood is at once accomplished and to be accomplished, unlike the facthood of objective fact which is only accomplished and the reality like that claimed for the moral *ought* which is only to be accomplished.

The complete accomplishment of psychic facthood is conceivable as implying presen-

tation that is wholly turned into known object, which would mean, not the lapse of the conscious distinction of object from presentation such as characterises sense-perception, but the conscious or evident objectivity of what in presentation is more than the sense-given object and suggests a metaphysical reality—what in ordinary psychic fact is only not denied as objective and may be conceived to be subjective. The image of a believed object, for example, is more than the perceivable object in the sense that it appears *being* formed and not given as formed. The forming is presented as a process of the object itself and yet somehow prior to its existence as formed. There is no ground to take it as merely subjective, for it appears to be seen in the non-introspective attitude though the object as formed is distinct from it. As a becoming of the object prior to its accomplished being, it implies a metaphysical fact that is not known as intelligibly related to the object,

appearing as it does as an un-objective character of the object which is a contradiction. It is in this sense known as unknown in the object and felt as dissociated from it. If imagination were to be realised, this contradiction would disappear, the becoming would be evident as a substantive fact and the object would be seen as its contingent manifestation. The image would then be dissociated in knowledge and not in mere feeling from the object and would be said to have achieved a free existence. Similar suggestions of metaphysical reality and the possibility of realising it would be presented by psychic states higher than the imagination.

To such a view a Kantian may be supposed to object that the metaphysical reality thus adumbrated in the presentation is only subjective though it appears real in the object by illusion, by a permanent illusion which we can critically correct without being able to remove.

The critical correction may only be sought to be strengthened in a non-cognitive way—the moral or aesthetic way—with the entertainment of the metaphysical reality in faith. Our contention would be that the appearance of its objectivity is incomplete but not illusory, that the illusion is to take it as known but not as knowable, that if it were unknowable, it could not be entertained in faith even for non-cognitive realisation and that the demand to know it is legitimate if not necessary. The thought of the metaphysical entity is a conscious problem but the problem is soluble in a mode of knowledge in which the object would appear as its free efflux, as what it can be but need not be. The metaphysical would appear in such knowledge as an evident real, as the existent fact of knowledge itself, with the object as its free possibility and as negated in its actuality.

That metaphysical reality is subjec-

tive is admitted in the sense that it is not an *object* behind the perceivable object. The objective attitude of metaphysic should terminate with the recognition of something that is known as unknown in the object, of the contradiction in the presented unobjective character of the object. But this unknown something that is known as such and formulated is not *merely* subjective in the sense of being illusory or in the sense of being the content of a faith that can never be turned into knowledge. To take it as merely subjective is to assume the object to be alone knowable and to be incapable of being *known* as put forth subjectively or freely. It is to deny the facthood of the constructive function by which the perceivable object comes to be for the subject. The epistemological functions are indeed believed and not known but they are not believed as merely subjective. They are no doubt symbolised by objective metaphors

but the symbolism is necessary and has to be entertained in faith. The demand to entertain the objective symbolism in faith is inconsistent with the *denial* of the knowability or objectivity of the functions. To be aware of a description as metaphorical but necessarily so is to take it to be unknown in the sense of being unrealised, of being imagined to be known but not yet known. It implies the possibility of knowing not indeed by any logical procedure but by a specific self-realising activity of the imagination itself. It argues a gratuitous diffidence to take such activity to be a mystic chimera. The imagination of knowing or the symbolising faith would not be faith at all if the possibility of such subjective achievement of the feeling of knowledge were to be denied.

A faith that is spiritually demanded to be entertained cannot be taken to be incapable of being turned into knowledge.

The moral postulates of Kant, for example, are such faiths. There is indeed no *moral* demand to entertain them, for they proceed from the demand for moral willing and there is no obligation on the part of the will to contemplate their objects. But when they have proceeded, are they mere speculative luxuries? Is the formulation of their objects with an *as though* spiritually indifferent or does it suggest a hope and a discipline to realise the hope of there being a grade of subjective realisation higher than the moral? Such a grade may be admitted as 'religion within the limits of pure reason' but the conceit of possible metaphysical knowledge, it may be said, need not therefore be reinstated. The conceit would be to Kant a moral impurity and critical honesty as essential to moral purity is essential to moral religion. But the conceit that implies intellectual dishonesty is the belief that metaphysical reality

is known, not that it is knowable. To take the spirit as finally known when its reality is to be achieved would be to take away the will to achieve. But if the spirit is believed to be unknowable, is not the will to achieve equally taken away? The will to realise the self, whether in knowledge or otherwise—for there may be different modes of realisation, implies at any stage the knowledge of the self as not known and the belief that it is something more than as it is known. It cannot imply a belief in the self that is not knowledge at all, far less a belief in the self as unknowable.

The distinction of the object that is non-perceptually known from its knownness, presentation or idea is just its character of being unknown which is believed and sought to be isolated by introspection. The known object is thus a problem to all knowledge other than perception. Perception is at once full know-

ledge, and restricted knowledge, full in so far as no lack of knowledge is felt in it and restricted because nothing beyond the object is necessarily suggested by it. In imaginative knowledge, as in higher forms of non-perceptual knowledge, there is a felt lack of intimacy with the object known while something is known in the object—its becoming before being, for example—which is unknown in the sense of not being as evident as the perceived object and of being incapable of being perceived. It is believed as constituting the reality of the perceivable object, the object being its appearance which is not unreal and in this sense a phenomenon of the reality. Non-perceptual knowledge is thus knowledge of the object as phenomenal with belief in a reality constituting it.

There is no explicit belief in metaphysical reality except as thus implied in the knowledge of the phenomenal. To know the phenomenon is not *not* to know

the reality but to know it as unknown and, it may be, as wanted to be known. Belief that is not knowledge at all is either unaccompanied by an idea of the object as distinct from the belief or is false belief. It is not possible therefore to say about the postulates of moral or aesthetic consciousness that they have only to be believed and cannot be known. They are infact known as unknown, known as objects that are not to be rejected as permanent illusions but to be contemplated as symbols of the reality to be known. What in the case of the understanding is known as phenomenon is in the case of the reason known as symbol, neither of which can be taken in our ordinary consciousness to be illusory though they would be realised as illusory if the reality that is known as unknown were to be completely known.

It would indeed be wrong to say that what is known as unknown is necessari-

ly wanted to be known, that there is a necessity for the idea of a believed object to get transformed into knowledge. The knowledge of the unknown as such is the precondition as much of moral or aesthetic realisation as of cognitive realisation. It would be equally wrong on the other side to say that for non-cognitive realisation it is necessary to give up faith in the knowability of the unknown. Belief in the unknowability of reality is not only not demanded; it is impossible and although in a sense the unknowable real can be conceived, the confusion of this mere conceiving with belief will exclude the possibility of all spiritual realisation. We know or believe the reality to be unknown but we cannot believe it to be unknowable. We can doubt the knowledge of the phenomenon or symbol such as is implied in the knowledge of the unknown reality; but either such doubt does not amount to disbelief or

if it does, the belief in the unknown reality also disappears, for that stands so long as the knowledge is not doubted. While the belief in the reality persists, the doubt is only an imaginary doubt, only the conceiving of a disbelief—no psychic fact at all but only a fringe of it—a conceiving of the totally unknown that is yet real. The concept of the totally unknown reality is the imaginary concept of the unknowable.

The factors of actual knowledge can never be proved to be necessary to all knowledge. A content that is claimed to be known may be shown afterwards to have been only believed or to be known as unknown but cannot be shown to be unknowable in the sense of being totally unknown and yet demanded to be believed. So long as it can be spoken of and believed, it is not to be regarded as totally unknown on the ground of some factor of actual knowledge being wanting. If the thing in

itself or an Idea of Reason is spoken of and believed, it is already known as unknown; and because of the two factors of actual object-knowledge—thought and intuition, either is wanting in this case, one has no right to doubt such knowledge as is there already or—what amounts to the same thing—to doubt the knowability of the unknown. To know something to be unknown implies infact a demand to find a condition of its being known and if the conditions of other admitted knowledge be not there, it is a call to revise our epistemology and not to reject the knowledge of the unknown that sets the problem.

The knowledge of the unknown is what starts the actual problem of realisation whether in the cognitive or in the non-cognitive direction. The demand for either mode of realisation is absolute, though there is a spiritual choice—which is not merely the free choice of

a will—between them. The non-cognitive mode does not entertain the demand that the unknown that is known as such should be known as known, that the belief in the reality has to be turned into the knowledge of it as evident. Not that it therefore demands that there should be a belief in its unknowability: it would infact be impossible with such a belief. What is demanded for any mode of spiritual realisation is that there should be the knowledge of a reality as beyond the known and that it should not be known as unknowable. The non-cognitive mode of realisation does not demand the belief that it is the only mode and that the cognitive mode implies, as Kant would have it, a fanatical conceit or theosophic illusion. The impossibility of the cognitive mode would argue the impossibility of the non-cognitive modes as well.

Thus we meet the Kantian difficulty. Psychic fact, we said, involves presenta-

tion from which the perceivable object is distinct and which accordingly is object and more than object. It is *more* in the sense of being a metaphysical reality constitutive of the object which is its phenomenon, a reality that is known as unknown and as knowable, though the complete knowledge of it need not be demanded. Psychic fact as embodying belief in such reality is at once real and realising, realising as being already real, this being the objective counterpart of knowing the object as unknown. To Kant, metaphysical reality—what in presentation appears to be known as unknown in the object—is only thought and believed and appears to be known by an inevitable or permanent illusion. We agree that the introspective awareness of the presentation as distinct from the object is not knowledge of knowing but only imagination of knowing the metaphysical. The imagination however is not an

illusion but only incomplete or unrealised knowledge and hence the imagined knowing appears as the knowing of the unknown as such in the object. There is no question of turning this imagined knowing into actual knowing by sense-intuition : it can be actualised, if at all, by the concreting activity of imagination itself. Metaphysical reality is only symbolised in objective terms : it is not literally objective though the symbolising may be a step towards knowledge of it as a subjective reality and need not be in the service of willing or feeling only. The subject may be sought to be realised morally or emotionally and the conceit of knowing the reality may be dropped but there is no necessity to drop it. Cognitive realisation of the metaphysical reality as subjective has to be admitted at least as an alternative spiritual possibility.

In this cognitive realisation, the knowledge of the unknown as such im-

plies the demand to know the metaphysical reality not as an object hidden behind the perceivable object but as that of which the object is a free efflux and to know empirical fact as real not by being given but by the self-shining substantively existent cognition of it. What appear as characters of the object—characters like forming, pastness or necessity revealed by imagination, memory or inference—would in such realisation cease to be adjectival and appear substantive. Psychic fact would not only appear isolated from its object in the stage of introspective realisation proper to it but would cease to be distinguished from introspection as its object, shining out as a mode of introspection itself, as a self-evidencing functional fact. The phenomenal object—the object as imagined to be perceived—would appear to be a possibility that is not actual by its own right, being negated or turned into illusion in this

sense though not in the sense that when put forth, it is not real at all.

Psychic fact appears to our ordinary unrealised introspection as more concrete than objective fact only in promise and not in actuality. It does not however appear as co-ordinate with objective fact: it is what should be more real but is actually less real. To be more real is not to be a whole of which objective fact is an element, for the unobjective element of psychic fact that is known in introspection as the unknown character of the object is what constitutes the reality of the object. Psychic fact contains within it objective fact as a possibility but it would be wrong to say that the realisation of the psychic *must* mean the actualisation of this possibility. Actualisation of a possible is indeed a necessity to knowing, provided we choose to know or to adopt the cognitive mode of realisation. Object is a possibility within the psychic only in the sense that

it *can* be actualised, not that it will or need be actualised. It is not comprehended in the psychic in the Hegelian sense.

The Indian conception of a specific activity of realisation on the part of the individual spirit is alien to modern philosophy generally and specially to Hegelian philosophy. The individual spirit is supposed in the latter to be individual so far as he is subject and does not know his subjectivity objectively. He knows it objectively only as he finds it through non-cognitive spiritual activity. He asserts it non-cognitively but does not in such assertion will *towards* it as what is to be developed, does not know it and stand outside it in spiritual willing though in the consciousness of the resulting fulfilment, he knows the subjectivity to have been developed. To the absolute spirit however, his will to realise his subjectivity is knowledge of his subjectivity *in* the willing and not

after the willing : realisation in the Indian sense is thus admitted in the absolute spirit alone. So far as it is admitted, it is understood as cognitive, non-cognitive activity being only a stage or constituent function in it. So the object so far as it is known as unknown in the psychic state would be taken by the Hegelian to be known by the individual as eternally known by the Absolute, as what not only can but will be unfolded by the psychic, being eternally unfolded in the Absolute. It is this necessity that is denied here as against the Hegelian : object as an ideality within the psychic is what can be unfolded but need not be. The psychic is more concrete than the object in the sense that it can freely put forth the lesser reality; and even as it does put forth, it does not lend to it its whole reality but keeps itself still as more concrete than the manifested object. Nature is still to the Psyche a

magic or playful appearance.

The parting from the Hegelian view is suggested at a comparatively late stage. But the view of the psychic as co-ordinate with the object and still more the view of it as comprehending the object as a real element have to be rejected at the very start. There is a tendency in certain recent developments of psychology to reject the ghostly psychic fact as co-ordinate with objective fact either in favour of an experience-unity of subject and object or in favour of the biological unity of the organism and its environment. We are not concerned with the latter for the present. The experience-unity of subject and object is supposed to be known in introspection. It is the psychic fact as implying the object as a real element, the presentation which is not not-object and from which the object is differentiated out by 'inter-subjective intercourse'. Now the question is if this expe-

rience-unity is rightly claimed to be known by introspection, known so unambiguously that it can be proposed to be substituted for the current duality of subject and object. All that can be admitted is that we do not distinguish the presentation from the object as we distinguish the object from the presentation: we only cannot deny that the presentation is object though the object is other than presentation. The distinguishing of the object from its presentation is definite knowledge but the non-denial of the identity of presentation with its object does not amount to the knowledge of it. The presentation in fact cannot be known except as what the object is distinct *from*. By itself it is believed in introspection and it embodies belief in the object. Psychic fact as bound up with presentation cannot be asserted to *include* the object on the ground that presentation is not known as not-object or implies belief in the object.

The ordinary view of the ghostly psychic fact as co-ordinate with objective fact ignores the experienced non-distinction of presentation from its object while the view of experience-unity unwarrantably asserts it as identity. Is the duality of psychic fact and objective fact secured any better by the recognition of the distinction between the 'enjoying' and the 'contemplative' modes of knowing? For one thing, it is doubtful if the enjoying knowledge of the psychic fact should be called knowledge at all. Even if it be taken as knowledge of it as objectively unknown, the difficulty is to relate the content of it with the content of contemplative knowledge. The distinction of objective fact from presentation or psychic fact may be taken to be itself an objective fact that is contemplatively known. But the distinction of psychic fact from the object, to be known, would have to be enjoyingly known. All that however can be said to be enjoyingly

known is the psychic fact as distinct in itself. Its distinction from the object is only symbolically thought by an illegitimate extension of the reversible character of the relation of distinction within contemplative knowledge. It is not known but is only a symbolism for the felt dissociation or freedom of the psychic fact from the object.

III. The body as perceived and felt

Psychic fact has been taken to be fact of which we are introspectively aware as capable of existing apart from introspection. Introspection is the distinguishing of the presentation from its object, the object being given as distinct from the presentation. In perceptual knowledge, the object is not given as distinct from its presentation and hence perceptual knowledge is not at least directly the object of introspection and is not a psychic fact in this sense. We are however aware of the subject even in the sub-psychic perceptual stage. The body as externally and internally perceived, as observed and felt may be regarded as the subject in relation to the environment and psychology has to start with this bodily subjectivity.

The materialistic view that the subject is but the body is true in so far

as the body represents a stage of being of the subject. But it ignores the unique singularity of one's own body even as a perceived object. No merely objectivistic account can do justice to this singularity. The objectivity of other perceived objects is constituted by their position relative to the percipient's body which itself therefore cannot be taken to be so constituted. To the percipient, his body is an object situated in space relatively to some other percipient's body as imagined, being not perceived by himself in a space-position though not known therefore as non-spatial. The percipient as in his body or as his body is in this sense dissociated from the external world, being what his perceived world is distinct from. At the same time he cannot help imagining himself as included in the world though it may be as a privileged object.

One's own body is only half-perceived, the rest being eked out by imagination."

The unseen face of a solid object that is perceived is imagined by the percipient by imagining his own body being placed in a different position. To imagine the unseen half of one's own body however, the observer does not imagine his own body thus placed differently. He imagines *another* observing body, not his own, as thus placed. In this respect also his own perceived body is uniquely different from other perceived objects and has no place in the objective world that he conceives to be presentable to him as a solipsistic observer. The world as a construction out of the views or perspectives of many observers cannot be simply identified with the world constructed out of the views of the same observer in different positions. The former is not indeed known as other than the latter but it is a world organic to a subject that feels dissociated from his body, a world therefore that has no perceivable position and involves a space

that he as percipient cannot take to be objective to him. Thus even if the subject is taken as nothing but one's own perceived body, it involves the knowledge of something unknown as such in the object, something that cannot be understood in terms of the perceptible object in the merely objectivistic attitude. It still implies the mystic awareness of dissociation from the object in which subjectivity consists. What is intended by the word *I* cannot be characterised even in the lowest stage of subjectivity as simply *this* object.

One's own body is not only perceived from outside : one is immediately or sensuously aware of it also from within in what is called feeling of the body. This feeling is not like the feeling of an object a psychic fact from which the object known is distinguished. The bodily feeling is but the felt body which is not known to be other than the perceived body. Yet the perceived body is

distinct from it so far as it is an 'interior' that is never perceived and cannot be imagined to be perceived from outside. Introspection indeed is sometimes taken as nothing but sense-perception of the interior of the body. But the interior cannot be understood here as the interior that one may imagine oneself seeing. To say that it is the same spatial interior, only appearing indefinite, is to ignore the qualitative difference that is felt between the indefiniteness of a perceived position and the indefiniteness of a felt position, the position for example of a pain in the perceived body. Our knowledge of objective space may have been developed from the felt spread of the body or the felt location in it but we are always aware of such felt space as only *partially* defined into perceived space and therefore cannot assert the former to be nothing more than the latter. Perceived space, however it may be extended and complicated by the geometric imagination

can at best symbolise the uniquely felt space that sets the problem of objective interpretation and is always in advance of the interpretation. It is even as the uniquely singular *I* is symbolised by the objectively singular *this*, being never adequately interpreted by it.

Objective space that is indefinitely perceived is the same as the objective space that is definitely perceived and the definition does not involve any fresh objectification. But felt space is indefinite in the sense that it is more than the objective space it is defined into, *more* in the sense already explained in which the presentation of an object is more than the object. The felt interior of the body may thus be regarded as the prototype of the observable interior, not merely the latter as presented indefinitely but what can only be symbolised by the latter in its full definiteness. Definite objective space is related to felt space as the objective exterior is related to the

objective interior, the latter relation being infact the reflection of the former relation.

The awareness of the body from within is indeed sensuous but it can hardly be called sense-perception. It is only not denied to be perception, though the perceived body as an object among objects is distinguished from the body as felt from within. The body is felt as extending from a vague interior to the outer surface that may be both felt and perceived. But the perception of the body stops at the surface and if it is extended by the imagination of the interior, the interior is still imagined as an external surface. The perceived and imagined body is always an exterior which may also be felt but the felt interior can never be imagined as perceived. Thus the felt body cannot be distinguished from the perceived body though the latter is distinguished from the former.

The relation between the felt body

and the perceived body is similar to the relation of presentation and its object in non-perceptual knowledge. There is however the difference that introspection into such knowledge is possible because the presentation is felt to be dissociated though not known to be distinct from its object while there is no introspection into body-feeling, as we are not aware of it as dissociated from the perceived body. Body-feeling and felt body are only verbally distinct; and the awareness of the felt body is not the awareness of anything but the perceived body though the perceived body is distinguished from the felt body. As in the case of the perception of objects, there is no conscious duality of presentation and object in body-feeling and as in the case of non-perceptual knowledge, the perceptible object—here the body—is distinguished from something which however here is the felt body and not presentation and is not suspected like presentation as the

possibility of anything other than the perceived body. Body-feeling may accordingly be regarded as not psychic fact but the potentiality of it. The problem of dissociating it from the objective body does not yet arise, as it arises in the case of psychic fact. But the possibility of dissociation is there, in the actualisation of which body-feeling may be conceived to be transformed into psychic fact. Actually in body-feeling, we are not interested in withdrawing from the environment: it is only an interest derived from higher stages of subjectivity that suggests such withdrawal.

We may consider body-feeling in relation to psychic fact and introspection into psychic fact on the one hand and to the perceived body and perceived object on the other. The perceived body is only potentially dissociated from the perceived object inasmuch as it is not merely like presentation not denied to be object but is positively known as object.

There is no explicit awareness of dissociation from the object but since position relative to the body, which is a constitutive character of the object, may not be analysed out in perception, the object is only half-distinguished from the body, the body being therefore only implicitly or potentially dissociated from it. The object however is fully distinguished from the felt body: the perceived object presents exterior surface only, its so-called interior being as perceived or imagined to be perceived still an exterior. Corresponding to this full distinction from the felt interior, there is the actual but imperfect dissociation or freedom of the felt body from the perceived environment. The felt body however does not appear even imperfectly dissociated from the perceived body. It is only potentially dissociated because the perceived body is half-distinguished from the felt body in the sense one who observes his body as exterior to him may not feel it.

Again the perceived body is fully distinguished from psychic fact—from the imagination of the body, for example—which however is imperfectly but consciously dissociated from it. There may be consciousness of the body as *mine* and at the same time as not other than myself, unlike the consciousness of the object which if felt as *mine* is felt as not *me*. The felt body is however only half-distinguished from psychic fact, since it is the feeling of the body on the one hand and is not actually dissociated from the perceived body on the other. Psychic fact accordingly is only potentially or implicitly and not actually or explicitly dissociated from the felt body. In introspection into psychic fact, this potential dissociation of the psychic fact from the felt body becomes imperfectly actual: there is no awareness of the psychic fact as not involving bodily feeling at all though bodily feeling as the felt body itself is

other than the psychic fact. The felt body begins to get resolved into a bodiless psychic feeling in introspection and may be conceived to be fully resolved when introspection gets realised as assured knowledge. Meantime our ordinary introspection involves awareness of the felt body as not other than the perceived body from which however psychic fact is felt to be completely detached. It is in this sense only that introspection may be taken as the sense-perception of the bodily interior. Strictly speaking, it is the awareness of a psychic fact felt as fully detached from the perceived body or the bodily exterior and half-detached from the felt bodily interior which also is half-detached from the bodily exterior.

The facthood of the subjective is constituted by this feeling of detachment or freedom. The first hint of this freedom is reached in the feeling of the body. In the perception of the object, there need not be the knowledge of the object

being distinct from the body. Developed perception may involve such knowledge but still the body is taken as perceived object. When the perceived body is distinguished from the felt body, the exterior from the interior, we have an explicit feeling of distinction, detachment or freedom from the perceived object. Apart from the specific activity of realisation which subjectivity suggests, the first given feeling of freedom in body-feeling is what all freedom of higher grade involves and derives its meaning from. Subjectivity apart from spiritual discipline is rooted in body-feeling and is only imagined to be dissociable from it. Psychic fact is then fact because of the knowledge of object or the presentation that it involves, because of the consequent felt detachment of it from the perceived body and of its non-detachment from the felt body. In introspection indeed there is the initial detachment of psychic fact from the felt body but in-

tropection itself is fact only as a fringe of some psychic fact which is undetached from the felt body. This initial detachment here is only imagined, for the felt body is not yet turned into a psychic feeling, introspection being only the faith that the detachment can be realised. The realisation of this freedom from the felt body is the pre-condition of all distinctively spiritual activity.



IV. Knowledge of absence as a present fact.

The perception of objective fact does not imply a distinguishing of the object from the presentation of it. That there is a presentation here from which the object is distinct is not directly known by introspection. Perception as a psychic fact is known only in introspection into non-perceptual knowledge. In memory, for example, there is the distinguishing of the past object from the presentation (image) of it and in introspection into memory, there is the further distinguishing of the past perceptual presentation of the object from the present image of it, the object being thus known as having been unconsciously distinct from the past presentation. The perceived object may however be directly distinguished from the felt body which, as has been pointed out, is like the perceived object undis-

tinguished from presentation but yet involves a feeling of detachment from all object other than perceived body. The feeling of the body may accordingly be taken to be an implicate of developed perception, of the perception of the object as distinct from the felt body and to be only a fringe of perceptual knowledge. The knowledge of absence as a present fact that now comes up for discussion is similarly a fringe of object-perception of a higher grade, involving like all perception no distinction of the fact from the presentation of it. The absence of object that is immediately known as a present fact is just midway between the body felt to be present and the presentation that is felt to be detached from present fact in non-perceptual knowledge.

Objective fact may be said to be present as external, as internal and as absent. The felt body is objective fact in its internal aspect. An object may be

also directly known to be *now* absent, to be 'present as absent' in this sense—a paradoxical phrase to be justified presently. All these three aspects may be said to be known in connexion with sense and involve no distinguishing from presentation. A present object as external may be distinguished from other present objects as external, from a present object as internal or from the present absence of itself. The feeling of the body is already a detachment from the external object though not from the body as external. The direct knowledge of the present absence of an object is a detachment not only from the object but also from the perceived body though not from the body as internally felt. The absence of an object, so far as it is located, is located like its presence in reference to the body but the reference is in opposite directions. The object as present is there away from my body. In the case of absence, the object being missed

or unreachd by my body is what my body is away from : the absence is where my body is not. Thus the body as external is distinguished from the object as absent and not the latter from the former. Corresponding to this distinction, there is the felt detachment from the body of the present absence of the object or of the object as now missed, the consciousness of the absence or the absent being thus removed from the space round the body.

The sense-conditioned knowledge of an object being now absent is not to be confused with the memory, expectation or imagination of the object. None of these need involve knowledge of its *present* absence. An object may be remembered, expected or imagined though it is now present : non-perceptual knowledge of it may co-exist with perceptual knowledge. There are cases again in which there is no distinct image of the absent object at all and where yet we

may be aware of the perceived locus of the absence as empty or devoid of an indefinite something. A consciously imagined object as now absent or the absence of an object not consciously imagined that characterises a perceived locus as empty is known in connexion with sense and known, if not in perception, in a cognitive mode undissociated from perception. The cognition is a fringe either of the perception of the locus or of the perception of the body and is in either case undissociated from the feeling of the body.

The cognition of an object as now absent may but need not involve the cognition of its absence as characterising a locus and the latter also may but need not involve the former. The two cognitions are therefore distinct and each as primary may involve the latter as secondary. A field, for example, was observed in the past with a tree standing on it, which might not have been parti-

cularly noticed at the time. The observer comes to the place when the tree has been removed and finds a new bare look about the place. He may not know that it is absence of the tree that makes the difference but he notices the difference, bareness or absence. To take another example, a person is looking for a book in a room but does not find it. He knows the book to be absent without being conscious of any empty look about the room and without in fact consciously referring the absence to the room at all. The former example would be a case of cognition of the *absence* of an object (tree) and the latter of cognition of an object (book) being *absent*. Neither cognition here need imply the other and both are direct sense-conditioned cognitions of objective fact. Yet each may develop into the other cognition : what is absent may come to be realised as tree in the first example and the absence of the book may come to be realised in expli-

cit reference to the room in the second.

Should the primary and secondary cognitions in each case be called perception? In the first case the absence of the tree is known as a character of the locus, the perceived field where the tree stood. The tree may not be definitely remembered but if remembered it is recognised to be the specification of the absence that continues to be known, the place not ceasing to wear the bare look because of the definite memory. As the place is perceived, absence as a character of the place may also be claimed to be perceived. There is however a distinction between the sense in which absence is a character and that in which a quality like colour is a character of the place. The place in being perceived with the bareness or absence is, if not perceived, at least imagined as what need not have the character, being presented as with a new look or in other words as distinct from what it might be. But to perceive the

place with a colour is not necessarily to imagine that it might be without it. The perceived locus of absence being imagined in the very perception of it as without the absence, the absence is only a floating adjective that unlike colour is felt to be dissociated from the locus. There is a suggestion of the absence being outside the space where the locus stands—the space round the body, of its being *nowhere* like an image, though it is believed to be objective and not psychic fact. The suggestion is not actual imagination of positionless objective fact but only the attempted symbolising of the feeling of detachment from objective space. The absence cannot be said to be not known as objective but it is felt to be dissociated from objective space. The perception of it as a character of the object in the feeling that it is not a character and with the conscious distinguishing of the object from it may be called aesthetic or imaginative per-

ception to distinguish it from ordinary perception.

In the second example, what is known in the first instance is not the absence of the book but the book as absent. The book is not found and the room where it is not found is not perceived, at least immediately, to have any empty look owing to the absence. The book as absent is immediately known as a present objective circumstance that is neither remembered nor merely imagined. The missing of the imagined book is a characteristic experience, implying a feeling of the body not reaching it, which is interpreted as the objective fact of the book being absent. The knowledge of this fact of the book as absent is with the conscious imagination of the book as found being distinct from it and implies the feeling of the present fact being outside objective space altogether. Such knowledge also may therefore be called aesthetic or imaginative perception. The difference

from the previous case is that what is imaginatively distinguished within the perception is not the perceived locus of the absence from the absence but the imagined object-as-present from the perceived object-as-absent. In neither case is the positive object distinguished from a presentation as in non-perceptual knowledge. It is distinguished in both cases from the objective fact of absence or the absent and not from a psychic fact. This objective fact that is distinguished from may thus be said to be perceived.

The primary cognitions of absence and the absent which are both perception may be followed by secondary cognitions. The perception of the absence of the tree in the first example may develop into the cognition of the tree as absent and the perception of the book as absent in the second example into the cognition of the absence of the book imagined explicitly as the book *in the room*. The interest may shift in the former case

from the bare look of the locus to what was in it but is no longer existing and in the latter case from the book that is missed to the locus which might have been but is not with the object. Are these secondary cognitions also perception ?

When after the perception of the absence of the tree as a character of the place, the tree as remembered is known to be now absent, there is no missing of a looked-for object like the missing of the book in the second example. If an object is looked for and not found, the object as it might be now, with presentness as its adjective, is perceived to be absent. Again when absence is known as a character or adjective of a present locus, it is taken to be perceived. But when as in this case *that* object tree is known to be *now* absent, the presentness is not adjective either to the object or to the locus but is only an adverbial mode of the adjective *absent*. What is consciously referred to as *now* is neither

the object nor the locus but the absence only. *That* object is not now perceivable and the perception of this place is irrelevant to the knowledge of the tree as absent. Such knowledge is not perception: there is no perception that is not or does not consciously imply apprehension of a concrete as present.

The secondary cognition of *that* tree as now absent is not perception, though it is immediate and sense-conditioned cognition of the present. What is known to be *now* absent is known in the consciousness of not perceiving it, with the belief that it would have been perceived had it been present. Not that it is therefore *inferred* to be absent: the consciousness of not perceiving what, it is inferred, would have been perceived is itself no inference and is at once the objective knowledge of the present fact of absence. Present absence by itself is then immediately known in connexion with sense and inference by what may

be called conscious non-perception. This has to be recognised as a new mode of knowledge and is comparable with the pure perception of object, conceived as that to which the object is not given but before which it floats up like an image and is none the less believed. Conscious non-perception is indeed in connexion with sense but what is perceived by sense is irrelevant to its content.

The secondary cognition in the second example is also a case of conscious non-perception. To make it more readily intelligible, we may vary the illustration and consider the absence of a beloved person instead of a book that is looked for in a room. When such a person is missed or imaginatively perceived as now absent, there may not be any relevant reference to the locus viz: the room. But one may come to imagine the room as with the person and then realise his absence in reference to this imagined

content. To imagine an object in a perceived locus is a special form of imagination in which the present locus is viewed as characterising and not as characterised by the imagined content. The belief in the absence of the object as thus characterised by the locus, the absence here of the imagined room as sentimentally associated with the beloved person, is immediate knowledge but not perception. The absence is not taken to be fact *in* the present locus ; and as the presentness of the absence is not the presentness of any concrete thing, it cannot be said to be perceived. The secondary cognition is conscious non-perception, the room that is perceived by sense being turned into the imagined character of location of the imagined person.

The primary cognition of absence and the absent is imaginative perception and the secondary cognition of them is conscious non-perception. The relation of

these modes of cognition with the apprehension of the body has now to be brought out. The primary cognition is related to the perception of the body as the secondary cognition is related to the feeling of the body. The absence of the tree in the first example is where its locus is. The tree as absent however is not essentially referred to the locus, being felt in fact as outside the space round my body, as detached from reference to the perceived body. The positionlessness is felt and believed as a mode of my body-feeling which is dissociated from the object. The *now* or presentness of the absence is the *now* or the presentness of the body-feeling. But while the *now* of the body-feeling is not distinguished from the *then* as remembered or the *might be* as imagined, being only an implicit *now*, the *now* of the absent tree in this case is so distinguished. The *absent-now* is felt dissociated from the perceived body as the felt body is not.

Thus the felt body is imperfectly distinct from the *absent-now* which therefore only appears to be a mode of the felt body, being undetached from it but really represents a stage higher and just falling short of the detached image. There is a similar relation of the primary and secondary cognitions in the second example to the perceived body and the felt body.

In the imaginative perception of absence and the absent, there is no felt dissociation from the position of the perceived body, which however is imperfectly distinguished from the imagined position of absence or of the absent. In conscious non-perception, there is the felt dissociation from the perceived body but not from the felt body, though the felt body has begun to be distinguished from the fact of absence or the absent. The relation of the perceived body in the former case and of the felt body in the latter to the known absence is like the relation of the perceived body to the felt body.

The perceived body is half-distinguished from the felt body which however is not felt to be dissociated from the perceived body. Absence imaginatively perceived is thus on a level with the felt body, both being felt undissociated from the perceived body which however is half-distinguished from them. Absence known by conscious non-perception is on a higher level, being felt half-dissociated from the perceived body which however is fully distinguished from it and undissociated from the felt body which is half-distinguished from it.

Conscious non-perception then is a transitional stage between body-feeling and imagination with which psychic fact begins. It is the consciousness of presentness without space-position, the same as the presentness of the felt body but distinguished from such absence of the perceived object as is realised in imagination, memory or expectation as the *might be*, the past or the future. It is free

from space but not from the present and accordingly does not imply a presentation of the object as dissociated from the object. Psychic fact begins with the distinguishing of what the present is not. Conscious non-perception is the distinguishing of the present from the detached presentation and not reversely and may be taken as the immediate pre-condition of the felt detachment of the presentation from the present. Were one to start with object-perception as the actual standard of knowledge, the first clear hint of the subjective fact would be realised in the knowledge of absence through conscious non-perception.

V. The Image

Psychology does not begin till the perceived object is distinguished from the half-perceived body. The body may not be felt as dissociated from the objective world but it is still realised as a uniquely central object round which the world is disposed. To those who would not go farther in psychology, introspection is only observation of the indefinite body-interior and psychic fact is only a bodily attitude, the beginning of the behaviour of an organism to the environment. Some however would go one step farther and admit the image as a unique fact, appearing as a quasi-object from which object including the body is distinguished. Psychology to them cannot ignore the image, even it be only ancillary to bodily behaviour. The image may be functional in character as a reference to the object, the reference being ultimately a behaving

mode ; but that it appears presented as a substantive something from which the object is distinct and exists in a sense in which the object does not exist cannot be denied.

The meaning of facthood appears to change as we pass from the perceived object as fact to the image as fact. This is realised if we interpose between them the three entities so far discussed—the perceived body, the felt body and absence of object as known in conscious non-perception. Each later term in the series appears to be fact in a sense different from the term before it—the perceived body from the perceived object, the felt body from the perceived body and so on. Facthood as an abstraction has an unformed symbolic meaning : its actual meaning depends on the nature of the content that is taken as fact. Fact in general means only what is believed or asserted but what fact means as a predicate applied to a content apart from the sub-

jective function of assertion is indeterminate. Its meaning depends on the form of known-ness of the content, the known-ness that is its constitutive character and is abstracted by the so-called psychological introspection. The object is object to us so far as it is given and not self-evident like I, so far as it is presented and believed as more than it is known, so far in fact as it is known to be unknown. Known-ness as an abstraction emerges only with this positive awareness of the unknown and has meaning only in reference to it. If the abstraction by itself has a meaning, it stands for an indeterminate which is not given nor yet is self-evidencing like the knowing I, being at best what is to be known. The concept of fact in general or known-ness by itself is thus a problem in meaning and not an accomplished meaning. Meantime facthood is but a name for many grades or modes of fact which have no *actual* relation

of similarity or point of similarity. We have accordingly to begin by accepting the different grades of fact as implying different meanings of facthood.

A perceived object is necessarily a spatial object having a position relatively not only to other perceived objects but also to the percipient's body. The perceived parts of his body are to him like outside objects situated relatively to some part of his body that he does not perceive nor even imagine himself perceiving but imagines only as perceivable (by another) and yet as continuous with the part that he perceives. His perceivable body as a whole is not perceived by him as situated relatively to the object. The perceived positional relation of one object to another is reversible but that of the object to the percipient's body as a whole is not reversible. Position relatively to the percipient's body is a character that constitutes the facthood of the perceived

object but his body as a perceivable fact is not constituted to his perception by position relative to the object though it is imagined by him as situated relatively to another spectator in a perceived objective position. This lack of perceived position is what distinguishes the facthood of one's perceivable body from the facthood of the objects perceived by him.

The imagined position of the perceived body is in objective space, space that is all exterior to the actual or imaginary percipient. Interior and exterior within objective space are understood relatively to two spectators: what the same actual spectator perceives is only the exterior. What he apprehends as interior is the felt space: his felt position consists in withdrawal from objective space, though it is not known as other than the imagined position of the perceivable body. The body is still felt to have a position which objective position

is not but which is not therefore known as other than objective position. The interiority of the felt body is what distinguishes its existence from that of the perceived body.

The absence of an object is immediately known as a present objective fact. Has its facthood any reference to space-position? In what we have called the aesthetic or imaginative perception of absence, the absence is taken to be where the thing absent is imagined to be. Now in imagining an object in a perceived position, the position is turned into an imagined character of the object. The position of the absence of the object is thus imagined though not imaginary. The position of the perceived body is also imagined and of both it may be said that they are not unperceived because imagined, being infact perceived through the imagination. The difference is that the body is half-perceived by sense while the absence is

perceived wholly through imagination. Absence has a factual position only as the felt body is undetached from the perceiving body. The position of absence as distinguished from the absence itself, is like the perceivable body half-perceived through the imagination: the locus is perceived by sense and it is also imagined as turned into a character of the imagined object. Perceived absence then is on a level with the felt body but its position is on the level of the perceived body. Such absence is undetached from its position as the felt body is undetached from the perceived body.

Absence that is known by conscious non-perception is not referred to objective space. It is not known as with a position though it would be going too far to say that it is known as positionless. It is felt even as the body is felt, the belief in it being a bodily feeling of not feeling the object. Yet as the felt body is not detached from the perceived

body and appears spatial as the mystic interior, absence in conscious non-perception is referred to this interior. It is as though the absent object was in the felt body. Yet the felt body is half-distinguished from it, just as the perceived body is half-distinguished from the felt body. Absence is here not known as with position while the felt body is known as with an unknown position from which objective space-position is distinct. There is the further distinction that the presentness of the absence is asserted explicitly while bodily feeling is only the implicit feeling of presentness. It is the explicit presentness that makes it possible for absence to be known as objective and yet without position.

The image is known to be without position while absence in conscious non-perception is only not known with position. So too absence is known as present or *now*, while the image is not

known as *now*. The image has no space-position and it cannot be asserted to have a time-position which however is not denied. To imagine an object is not necessarily to know it as now absent. We may imagine it while we perceive it e.g. when the object is our body and we may perceive it wholly through imagination as in what has been called aesthetic perception. But we imagine the object also when we know it to be absent. In such a case we imperfectly distinguish the object as *now* absent from the image of the object, which however is undissociated from the absent object and as such is not denied to be *now* but is not therefore asserted to be *now*.

The ordinary perception of object is said to involve imagination but the image here is only inferred and cannot appear to introspection. In a perception like that of one's own body, there is the direct consciousness of something in it as not

sensed, from which the sensed portion of the body is distinguished but which itself is not distinguished from it. In what has been called aesthetic or imaginative perception, not only is the sense-perceived locus of its object distinguished from it : the object as imaginatively perceived is distinguished from itself as merely imagined though not conversely. In none of these cases is the image felt to be dissociated from the percept. In the knowledge of absence through conscious non-perception, the image of the absent object is felt to be dissociated from the felt body but not from the present absence. What is known to be wholly distinct from the image at this stage is the object as present and not as absent. The knowledge of present absence is still a mode of bodily subjectivity ; but in imagination as a free psychic fact, even the present absence is distinguished from the image ; and so the image, though not explicitly disso-

ciated from the presentness, is not known as with this character which is the last vestige of perceptible facthood. The image here appears with objective form but does not appear with objective position.

The relation of the image and of psychic fact generally to objective time has been the subject of controversy. There is the current banality that psychic facts are only in time while objective facts are in both space and time. We have pointed out on the one hand that absence that is known in conscious non-perception is not known to be in space though it is objective and that the image proper on the other is not known to be in time. We cannot assert nor can we deny that such objective absence is in space and that the image is in time. The image is assertible as not in space, neither in perceptible space nor in felt space. It has indeed spatiality as a character or form ; and it

is even possible to imagine an object on a perceived locus, where however the image is not in space but has space-position as an aesthetic expression. Thus there is a felt dissociation of the image from objective space and even from the felt interior of the body. Since the absence known in conscious non-perception is not consciously dissociated from the felt body, it is only half-distinguished from the image, being not deniable as in space while the image is so deniable; and thus the image is not felt dissociated from the present absence though it is potentially dissociated.

This potential dissociation of the image from the *now* is realised in thought. In the examples of non-perception so far given, it has been assumed that the object that is absent is imaged. But there may be cases where the absent object is only thought, as for example when we say 'no man is present here': man in general is here thought and not imaged.

The vague image of an individual man may float up but the absence that is known is the absence not of this man in particular but of all men. The image here as symbolising the thought may be said to be consciously dissociated from the presentness of the absence. Thus though the image need not be denied as *now*, it may be denied. We cannot assert that the image of the object now absent is *now* and we can in higher stages e, g. in the stage of image with thought definitely deny it.

The lowest stage of psychic fact is represented by the image without thought, emerging in the conscious non-perception of the absent as such. Just as the perception of the object half-consciously implies the perception of the body, this the feeling of the body and this again the conscious non-perception of the absent, so this last implies the image of the absent from which the absent as such is imperfectly distinguished. Attention here

is primarily directed to the objective absence but in distinguishing it we attend indirectly to the image of the object that is absent. As thus indirectly attended to, the image is not distinguished and appears without thought. There is no awareness yet of its being not objective: it appears as a ghostly object that does not consciously imply belief, much as the half-perceived body appears when an object is perceived to be *there*. The awareness of the image is still bound up with the perceiving attitude and is not introspective. The image is still consciously as though it were an object. It is like the illusion of the object persisting after correction, though it is only without belief and does not imply as in the case of illusion a conscious disbelief. It is only potentially psychical, being an object for possible introspection.

The distinguishing of the presentation of an object from the object is intros-

ception which does not amount to the knowledge of the presentation as a given distinct. The distinguishing of the object from its presentation is however a phase of object-knowledge. The presentation as thus distinguished from is an indefinite quasi-object. It is felt dissociated from the object as having no position in objective space and except in its lowest phase as image is felt also as not in time. In the case of the image, there is only no consciousness of its being an event in time : it is not felt to be not in time. Conscious non-perception of an object implies indeed the conscious image of the object but what is believed to be present fact is the *object* as absent, as distinct from the image which is neither believed nor disbelieved to exist at the moment. In the thought of an objective fact however, the meaning which is the presentation is not only not referred to time : its existence in time is meaningless.

In conscious non-perception of an

object, its image is not directly attended to and there is no introspective distinguishing of it from the object as absent. When it is introspectively attended to, it changes its character; the image appears as imagining, as being formed though not as unformed, as functional without ceasing to be substantive. A presentation like meaning also appears functional under introspection but loses its substantive character. The completed meaning is turned into the meaning act and loses its ghostly objectivity. All psychic fact conceived in introspection to be outside introspection is the quasi-objective fact of presentation which however—with the exception of the image—appears as a mere function or act under introspection. The ghostly psychic fact cannot accordingly be taken to be a mere illusion; it is what introspection testifies to as existing consciously outside itself and the lowest form of it viz. the image is apprehended even in the

objective attitude apart from the testimony of introspection. The view of psychic life as the self's transaction with quasi-objective presentation is suggested by the image. A presentation like meaning that wholly melts into function under introspection does not stand before the self as object for its attention.

The image appears under introspection as functional and substantive at the same time, as a form being formed. This forming or incomplete character of the image requires fuller consideration that it has received. There is a qualitative difference between the incompleteness of an image and the incompleteness of a perceived object, much like the difference between felt space and perceived space. The incompleteness of a percept is in reference to a fuller percept; taken by itself, a percept is finished and definite and an indefinite and unfinished sense-appearance is not yet a percept. The sense-given cannot be incomplete in

itself without being indefinite and without falling short of a percept. The image however is incomplete not merely in comparison with a percept but in itself; it could not in fact be complete without being a percept. There cannot be a finished form that is not believed as the form of a perceived object. The imagined form is always being formed without however being indefinite like the sense-given content which is being formed into a percept. It is definite because the consciousness of the forming is at once the consciousness of the form to be completed. The forming and the form appear to be seen together, as they are actually seen together in what has been called aesthetic or imaginative perception. The image under introspection is in fact a standing process where the forming is not chronologically prior to the form and yet appears distinct from the form which is its interpretation. Under introspection accordingly the image ap-

pears as not in time while the image before introspection, as in the stage of conscious non-perception, is only not known to be in time. The consciousness of the finished form that interprets the forming is sometimes called *idea*. But the idea at this stage is not a separate presentation but only a fringe of the image. It is not dissociated from the image as forming, which however is distinguished from it. The idea as dissociated from the image would be the next psychic stage.

VI. Thought.

The image under introspection appears as a forming form in which the finished form is evident in the forming process as its interpreting idea. The idea as dissociated from the image is idea of the object as not imaged and sought to be imaged. The object here appears indefinite and the imagining or forming that is started by the conscious want of the image is the process of defining it. This process which may be called the materialising of the dissociated idea is intrinsically incomplete and is ever to be completed. The undissociated idea of the previous stage is the complete form that as much appears to be seen as the incomplete forming. The dissociated idea thus implies the imaging process and the conscious want of the image. The want is here only partial but there may be idea of something in the object that cannot be defined or

concreted into image at all. Such idea is thought proper that is definite in itself and is not defined in meaning but at best fixed or detained in the mind by the images it may still call up. The images here have a consciously metaphorical or symbolising value for the idea.

Image or thought here is considered as presentation that embodies or at least does not exclude belief in the object. The mere image or the mere meaning, the object of which is disbelieved from the start is, as indicated before, no psychic fact at all. Now what in the object is believed specifically through imagination—viz. the form, though not posited in the space that is organic to the body, is still represented as spatial, appearing as though it were felt like the body. What is believed specifically through thought however does not thus appear to be intimately felt and is yet as definite as the imagined form. The

dissociated idea lies midway between the definite form and the definite intelligible, being non-spatial in form but indefinite and only partially definable by an incomplete forming. It may be called pictorial thought to distinguish it from thought proper, the object of which is definitely presented as unpicturable meaning. Picturable metaphors and symbols may be used to fix the identity of such meaning and for purposes of easy communication but they do not help to define or elaborate it.

The image lacks space-position but still appears spatial in form and temporal as forming or becoming and as such implies a belief in its possible objectivity. Thought as the awareness of the unimaginability of its specific content is the awareness of its objectivity being impossible and thus involves a complete detachment from objectivity. Thought is still about the object but it is of something about the object that is definitely

unobjective. In lower stages and even in the stage of body-feeling, something unobjective in the object is also presented but it is not known explicitly to be unobjective, not completely denied as objective. It is completely denied in thought and if it is still said to be something in the object, it is understood to be what *appeared* as objective, what the object was not distinguished from in the lower stages. The thinkable universal or relation, for example, was presented as objective in the lower stages and the object was never sufficiently distinguished from that presentation. Even in the stage of pictorial thought or the dissociated idea, the universal appeared as a quasi-spatial whole and relation as a quasi-temporal transition. In non-pictorial thought, this conceit of their quasi-objectivity is dropped, though the object continues to be referred to as what exists and is known without name and without relation. The universal and relation in

the object are recognised, if not as thinking, as not distinguished from thinking, the object given as distinct being reduced to unrelated singulars or unique contents such as may be conceived to be 'purely perceived'. As thus referring to the object, meaning is still objective though explicitly through thinking, being a presentation and not a free subjectivity.

Non-pictorial thought which is definite independently of the image may be sought to be metaphorically or symbolically indicated by the image. Metaphor differs from symbol: the object that is thought is imagined as though it were the same as the metaphor but not as though it were the same as the symbol. Both are recognised to be other than the object thought but while the metaphor is consciously employed as similar to the object, the symbol which is also remotely similar to the object in relational constitution is not employed *as* similar. The word is a symbol and not a metaphor for the object

meant ; the metaphor is only half-distinguished from the meaning while the symbol is fully distinguished. Thought in its higher grade is detained in the mind by the word and not by its figurative representation.

Thought as distinct from the forming image under introspection is a completed product and the thinking that does not amount to a complete thought is a misnomer and should only be called a trying to think. This complete thought is about an object and the object thought is quite definite, whatever indefiniteness or incompleteness there may be in the symbolic imaging of it. Thought is complete as dissociated altogether from time, not merely from time-position from which the image (at least under introspection) is also dissociated but also from the forming or ideal timing that characterises the image. It is complete in the sense of being eternal ; and spatial or temporal objectivity is distinguished from it. Still

thought is about the object and as such should be called presentation. Its content is such as is *necessarily* characterised as what the object is distinct from. Thought is thus a psychic fact, having a facthood apart from introspection. Despite its eternity, it would be incorrect to speak of it as a pure subjective activity. Much of the mysticism in Kantio-Hegelian philosophy has sprung from the confusion of thought with pure subjective activity, of reason with the spirit. Compared with the awareness of *I*, thought is objective and objective in its very dissociation from objectivity. It has still to be characterised in reference to the object as what the object is not.

That thought is a presentation comes out in the form of consciousness which we have called *trying* to think. Thought outside introspection is the accomplished meaning. The meaning stands in higher thought at any rate through the word. The word is quite distinct from the

meaning but as *being used*, it is only half-distinguished from the meaning while the meaning is not dissociated at all from it within thought. The identity of the meaning with the word cannot be denied though it would be going too far to assert it. The identity is disturbed in the consciousness of missing the meaning of a word-combination of which the constituents have a meaning. The problem what a combination of significant words means, if it means anything, is an intelligible problem and so attained meaning is distinguished from possible meaning. Attained meaning has accordingly a kind of being outside subjective activity and is a presentation in this sense.

What however is this possible meaning, the missing of an actual meaning, the trying to think? The logical form of word-combination or syntactical connexion is a generality that has no actual meaning apart from the constituent words

but cannot be denied to have a meaning when the word-combination has a meaning from which the meanings of the constituent words can be distinguished. The form of connexion here is not itself distinguished as an actual meaning, being only distinguished from. As itself distinguished, it is possible meaning; and in the problem of finding the meaning of a word-combination, the possible meaning is what symbolises the lack of actual meaning. Within thought, the image or the word furnishes the symbolism but here the form of thought itself constitutes the symbol for the felt problem. The feeling of the problem with the unrejected active faith in its solubility is the trying to think which is beyond thought or meaning, beyond all presentation.

VII. Feeling

Thought is still presented as meaning, as the unobjective something about the object, being characterisable only in reference to the object as what the object is not. The introspective awareness of meaning as distinct from the image is awareness of the explicitly unobjective. Feeling is also explicitly unobjective but it is not merely negative but positive as *subjective* fact without any reference to objective fact. The thought of object may accompany a feeling but it is recognised as only a symbolism for the feeling, as what no longer intends the object, being not consciousness of *object* as unknown but an avowedly over-definite representation of the merely unknown. The consciousness of the merely unknown as distinct from what is known as object that is also unknown is feeling. The consciousness may be called knowledge, such knowledge as has been sometimes

supposed to constitute dreamless sleep. It is purely subjective in the sense that there is no conscious reference to object even in the way of dissociation from it though not yet in the sense that the meanability or thinkability of its specific content is denied. Feeling is as much undissociated from its content 'absence of knowledge' as conscious non-perception is undissociated from the objective absence that is its content. In the *trying* to think, as in feeling, thought is distinguished from the conscious absence of thought which itself is not distinguished from thought. While however in the *trying*, there is no belief in the unmeant as a distinct content, feeling involves such belief, much as perception involves belief in an object as distinct but not as distinct from perception.

To introspection, the content of thought appears distinct from thought though it does not appear to be *given* as distinct. Feeling, so far as we are

aware of thought as only symbolising it, may be said to have a content, an unthought or unmeant content which however appears to introspection as only distinct in itself and not as distinct *from* feeling. While again in the case of thought or other psychic fact, introspection seeks to distinguish it from its content, it seeks to distinguish the unmeant content of feeling from the feeling and not *reversely*, though the seeking to distinguish does not amount to the knowledge of distinction in any case. Because psychic fact is distinguished in introspection from its object, it is believed to exist also outside introspection. But as the feeling is not thus distinguished from its content, it can not be believed to exist outside introspection as a merely conscious fact. Feeling is never outside introspection, just as perception is never within introspection.

Introspection into feeling however is an awareness of the feeling as apparent-

ly distinct from the awareness. Introspection into psychic fact is a distinguishing of the fact which appeared undistinguished from itself, consciousness being implicitly self-consciousness in this sense. Introspection into feeling however is an *identifying* of the feeling which appeared to be outside introspection as a psychic fact illusorily bound up with a presentation and implies the annulment of this illusion. Feeling is bound up with thought or imagination, being the awareness of their detachment as presentation from their objects, corresponding to the known distinction of the objects from their presentation. In introspection into psychic fact, the felt detachment is symbolised as a thinkable distinction of the psychic fact from its object, though its merely symbolic character is not appreciated as such. In introspection into feeling, the distinction of feeling from its presentative content is appreciated as definitely not known but only felt and

symbolised." The content as presented is recognised to be not *its* content. To distinguish a feeling from the meant content is to view the content as a mere symbolism. When thought views the image as its symbol, the symbol still stands as presentation though it is not meant. But when along with feeling, there is the awareness of meaning as its symbol, the symbol is not only not felt: its object-reference lapses altogether. The meaning loses its actuality and turns into the form of a possible meaning. Possible meaning is no presentation, as the awareness *as though* feeling meant something is no belief in it as fact. There may be a faith that some meaning of feeling will emerge but the faith is not a belief in what is at least partly meant actually. It may imply a trying to think which is not so much a doing as a wishing, being but the free self-expressive play of the feeling. When a presentation is reduced to mere play,

there is a make-believe and no belief. Not that the faith must be there but the belief in the object must lapse. Feeling as detached from meaning is awareness of the meaning as its symbolism and may in this sense be taken as implicitly introspective, being never a merely conscious fact outside introspection. Explicit introspection into feeling means only outgrowing the necessity of thus symbolising feeling by meaning and recognising that feeling does not mean anything but itself.

The place of willing may be indicated here as co-ordinate with feeling. If feeling represents the complete dissociation from objectivity, willing means the free identification with objectivity. Throughout we have been tracing the movement of dissociation, beginning with the dissociation of the perceived body from the object. To knowledge, the object is *there* and the body *here* is its presupposition; and as knowledge

deepens, there is a regress to prior presuppositions, the felt body etc. up to feeling or what we have called the knowledge of the merely unknown. Each presupposition persists undistinguished in a lower stage and hence feeling may be said to inform even the perceived object, though this is known only when feeling has been dissociated from thought. It is at this stage also that the identification in the lower stages is known to have been free in the sense of not being necessitated by the object. The playful self-expression of feeling in a meaning or thought as its symbol is the first conscious identification with a lower stage, self-objectification without the lapse of dissociation, the initial act of objective willing as distinct from spiritual willing. Willing starts as the aesthetic expression of feeling. The freedom from thought is as much a progress as a regress, as much a willing as a feeling. Regress and progress are two

distinct movements in the lower stages, distinct because the object as known is there the starting point. With the cancellation of the objective attitude, there is the consciousness of being free, of being unrestricted by the object whether for withdrawal from it in feeling or for conquest over it in willing.

Knowing means freedom both from blindness and from error, escape from the confusion of the object with the subject and from the identification of the subject with the object. As we have shown at many points, the distinguishing of the object from its presentation implies a half-detachment of the presentation from the object when a consciousness emerges of something in the object that is unknown, the presentation being however not denied to be object. The consciousness of the unknown is at the stage we have reached understood as feeling inwardness ; and the consciousness of the presentation as a ghostly object,

as what cannot be denied as object but cannot therefore be asserted as such is now interpreted as the objectifying or self-externalising function of the will. The so-called knowledge of the object thus appears to be a single function of inwardising and objectifying, of regress and progress, of feeling and willing. The freedom or detachment implied in knowing means the outgrowing of the positive attitude of not knowing, of conscious entertainment of the unknown—which is feeling—and of *conscious* projection of objectivity—which is willing. Thus to the knowing attitude, feeling and willing appear as what are jointly outgrown and as what also symbolise the inwardness and reality of knowledge.

The positive consciousness of detachment from meaning which is the last residuum of the object is feeling. Feeling is the knowledge of the purely unknown as such, the unknown that is not even

meant. It is only symbolised as knowledge *of* the unknown, though the unknown being unmeant, the preposition *of* has no meaning and is recognised as a mere exigency of language. There is no distinguishing of the knowledge from its content: the knowledge stands by itself and is the awareness of its content as no content, as unmeant. The next stage would be the awareness of the content as unmeanable. In feeling there is still the demand for a symbolical meaning to be denied, a will to expression, the awareness of the absence of actual meaning and the non-denial of a possible meaning. That will to expression is a trying to think and there may come after the trial the consciousness of a failure to think and the consequent abandonment of the trial. Such consciousness of failure may be regarded as feeling that has purged itself from the persisting will to objectification, as the awareness not merely of the unknown but of the contradictory

or unmeanable, of what is not imaginary but is given as false. It is feeling in the sense that it *comes*: if trying to think is still an activity, the consciousness of inability to think is what is borne in upon us.

The consciousness of given falsity or objective illusion has to be distinguished from the consciousness of the imaginary. In the example of the illusory snake corrected into the perceived rope, the snake appears after correction to have been not merely a sport of the imagination like golden mountain but to have been believed as real. At the same time while the disbelief in golden mountain implies no uncertainty as to its being merely imagined, the present disbelief in the snake implies an uncertainty as to its having been perceived. What we are conscious of now is that it is *as though* it was perceived. So we say about a dreamed object—'it is as though it was seen'. The snake, we say now,

was believed and not merely imagined but not known. What is now remembered as having been believed and appears as though it was known was not therefore merely imagined. Belief in an object ideated, as a psychic fact existing outside introspection, is presentation. The present awareness of an object as though it was known might be called appearance of presentation. The appearance of presentation is a disbelieved possibility of object. It cannot however be taken as imaginary, for an imaginary thing does not appear presented (with belief) at all. The awareness of an imagined thing may not be a belief in the thing but is belief in the presentation. The awareness of an imaginary thing is disbelief in the thing and is no belief in the presentation. The awareness of a thing as illusory is not only disbelief in the thing but implies at least a positive doubt about its presentation. Disbelief in the imaginary thing may still be called

knowledge, knowledge of the negation of all objective facthood. But disbelief in the illusory thing is not even knowledge of such negation, being the consciousness of an indetermination which is neither factual nor imaginary, neither presented with belief nor not presented at all. What being first presented with belief comes to be disbelieved cannot be asserted to be presented without belief: that it is presented cannot only be denied. Disbelief in the illusory object is not *knowledge* of its falsity but the awareness of what cannot be asserted or denied to be true. When this 'indescribable' content is altogether rejected, there is knowledge not of falsity but of the self.

The indescribable is unmeanable and so there may be a consciousness of the unmeanable and not merely of the unmeant in feeling. This consciousness cannot be said to be not feeling, though there is no longer the belief in the possibility of symbolising it by a meaning. Intros-

peption into the first stage of the feeling process means, as has been shown, not a distinguishing of the feeling from thought—for feeling does not exist except in being thus distinguished—but an identification of it, the positive assertion of the feeling being itself only, of freedom from thought constituting the very being of feeling. Such freedom is a positive being because there is no rejection yet of *possible* thought or meaning. The awareness of the unmeaning then, as implying such rejection, is freedom from the being of feeling, though as the lapse of the trying to think *comes* as a result of such trying, it cannot be said to be not felt. Roughly then two stages of feeling can be distinguished—freedom from actual thought and freedom from possible thought, from the faith in a possible meaning, from the will to think. It is the persisting will to think that constitutes the being of feeling in the lower stage. Freedom

from the will to think is thus feeling that has no being, possible feeling that yet is possible not to a will or trying but to feeling itself, being the feeling of self-negation as distinct from the lower feeling which is feeling of self-being.

The feeling of not having a feeling is not an uncommon experience. The awareness of wanting a feeling—whether sense-enjoyment, aesthetic satisfaction or spiritual serenity—is itself a feeling. All desire involves a present feeling of not having a feeling, an awareness of the ‘inferiority’ of the anticipatory pleasure to the actual feeling that is to come. It is not simply one feeling *due* to the want of another feeling but the feeling of the want of its own being or actuality. Nor is it yet the disinterested awareness of the want, a detachment from it such as introspection would imply. It can only be characterised as the *feeling* of a feeling, with which are bound up interest-

ing spiritual attitudes like sentimentalism on the one hand which confuses the felt want with the actual feeling that is wanted and the experience of the want on the other as a pain that miraculously ends in a fulfilment.

This feeling of a feeling is not introspection but the stage prior to it, even as the trying to think is prior to feeling, being the negative of which introspection is the positive equivalent, the self-negation of feeling or feeling detached from its being. Such detachment or self-negation is already the attitude of knowledge, knowledge of what is neither felt nor unfelt, of a negation that cannot be denied, of the indeterminate unmeanable or indescribable. Such knowledge may be regarded as introspection that yet has a being and is not denied to be the object of introspection. Introspection proper is not the object of further introspection.

The nature of this pre-introspective

knowledge may be intelligible through the analysis of a puzzle about the un-meanable. *Unmeanable* is itself a significant word and so the unmeanable, it may be said, is meant. The puzzle suggests a two-fold function of the significant word. Speaking as to the speaker has to be distinguished from speaking as to the hearer ; and to the speaker himself, the word being spoken has a function different from the word as already spoken. What the speaker means as unmeanable after having tried to mean may be to the hearer what he does not even try to mean. Again while in speaking of the unmeanable, as in any act of speaking, the speaker only means without contemplating the meaning as accomplished, the word as spoken appears either to his or to the hearer's contemplation to have an accomplished meaning. If the speaker does not contemplate it, the hearer (or he himself later) may contemplate it ; and if the speaker

contemplates, the hearer may not. There is thus a difference between the meaning being coined out or being understood and the meaning as accomplished and contemplated. We are aware of the unmeanable in two stages, as the meant unmeanable and as the mere function of meaning or speaking. The knowledge implied in the former is of a contradiction while that implied in the latter is not *of* anything, being merely knowing. The feeling of feeling is the former kind of awareness while the latter is just introspection. Self-negation in feeling of feeling is still a felt being, existent knowledge rather than the function of knowing. Introspection is complete dissociation from felt being and is the pure knowing function.

VIII. Introspection

Introspection into a subjective fact means a distinguishing of it. There is no direct introspective awareness of perceptual knowledge. In non-perceptual knowledge, object is already distinguished from presentation and the introspective awareness of such knowledge is the awareness of its distinction in itself with a feeling of its dissociation from the object. This feeling is symbolised as a thinkable distinction from the object by a reversal of the known distinction of the object from the presentation. Introspective distinguishing is only the knowledge of a subjective fact as distinct in itself, though in the case of subjective fact lower than feeling, it appears through such symbolised feeling of dissociation as the knowledge of the fact as distinct *from the object*. Feeling is nothing but this conscious dissociation, as is realised when presentation in the attenuated form

of meaning is known to be distinct from feeling. Introspection into feeling from which meaning is known to be distinct, feeling which is nothing but the conscious dissociation from the object is the awareness of feeling being distinct in itself only and does not involve the further symbolism of being distinct *from* anything. Thus while the introspective awareness of a psychic fact is the awareness of its distinction from object and therefore of its distinction in itself also as existing apart from introspection as presentation, the introspective awareness of a feeling proper is the knowledge of its distinction in itself only and is the recognition of the distinction as being entirely through introspection. Such recognition may be called an identification.

Introspection into feeling is the recognition of the distinct being of the feeling as entirely through the introspection. It is just the function of meaning the feeling, of distinguishing, referring

to or speaking of the feeling. Meaning as a function as distinct from the meant is intelligible only after the self-negation of feeling, feeling of wanting a feeling, the detachment of feeling from its being or the awareness of the meant un-meanable. To mean not merely the conscious absence but the conscious impossibility of meaning is the pure function of subjectivity, the function of introspection that is not objective even in the form of the meant unmeanable. If the feeling of feeling is already a detachment from subjective being, it is as a contradiction, as a be-ent want of feeling. Introspection is a subjectivity that is detached both from being and from negation, being positive as *freedom*. It is not simply like the meant unmeanable or the 'indescribable' what is neither be-ent nor non-be-ent, a negation that cannot be asserted or denied. It is the positive of which the negation is not even tried to be meant. The negation

of the function of meaning is a gratuitous problem in meaning which there is no call to solve. Unlike the illusory object which is first presented and then reduced to the unmeanable, this negation is an imaginary problem in meaning which can indeed always be asked in logical sport but suggests no actual uncertainty about the introspective function. The imaginary problem is never ousted but never amounts to an uncertainty about any actual belief. Introspection is an actual believing which can only be sought to be impugned by the imaginary problem of conceiving its negation and is therefore never actually impugned. The content believed in introspection is, as will appear presently, capable of being impugned but not the believing itself. We speak only of introspective believing because a belief the object of which turns out false is no longer a belief in the object but is still a fact to intros-

pective memory as the past believing in an unmeanable, as a contentless believing that is not other than the introspection.

The old argument against absolute scepticism that it is doubting on the strength of believing is untenable if it is intended to exclude doubt about the *object* of belief. The object of belief is always impugnable though the grounds of the doubt must be actual or believed to constitute a relevant doubt. The argument however is valid if it intends to say that believing cannot be doubted. It will be presently apparent that not object only but every subjective fact that is introspectively believed, even though it be meant as unmeanable, is capable of being doubted. Believing then would not be fact at all, being not even meant as unmeanable. Nor is it therefore an illusion, for an illusion about the subjective has a place, as will be shown, beyond the introspection that we are now considering.

Introspection is the function of believing or meaning which is not itself meant even as the unmeanable and is therefore not actually doubtable. It is just the first person I, the speaker who is not an object to introspection but is simply the function of speaking. Introspection is not believing *in* the I: it is the I, the believing that is not fact at all but is not therefore illusory. As not believing even in the meant unmeanable, it is not believing in anything distinguished from it and so may be loosely expressed as believing in itself. The conscious inadequacy of the expression is itself evidence of the believing being not believing *in* anything.

Introspection as a conscious dissociation even from feeling that is distinct only through it is an annulment of the distinction—what we have called identification. Introspection into a psychic fact bound up with presentation reveals that its subjective facthood is nothing

but the facthood of feeling. Such introspection appears to be a believing in a distinct because the distinctness of psychic fact is not immediately annulled by introspection, being reduced in the first instance to the distinctness of feeling. The direct unidentifiability of the psychic fact is what constitutes its apparently independent being; and it is thus that the psychic fact is pronounced by introspection itself as having a ghostly existence outside introspection. That it is directly unidentifiable is due to the fact that it is never a complete detachment from the felt body and that accordingly psychic fact never appears to it as having only the facthood of feeling. But there is the conscious semi-detachment of feeling from the meanable psychic fact pointing to the possibility of complete detachment; and there is the identifying introspection into feeling implying possible detachment from the being of feeling. This possible detachment from all distinct being is introspec-

tive awareness. Introspection is essentially the annulment of all distinct being, being self-identification or the conscious identity without being of the self.

The self is taken by Kant as the thinking function. The thinking function is thinking of a thought or accomplished meaning and Kant does not deny that the self as an Idea of the Reason is an accomplished meaning. There is however the awareness not only of trying to think without any accomplished meaning but also of the impossibility of meaning. We can mean the unmeanable and thus the speaking or meaning function is more fundamental than thinking. In calling introspection the self, we not only bespeak the detachment of the self from thinking and feeling but also take it to be a believing or self-identifying, the negation of which is not even a meant unmeanable and which therefore cannot be denied to be a self-knowing. The introspective self is self-knowing, not as

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having the self as the object of knowledge but as denying the distinct being of feeling, as identifying it without denying its being and as having itself no deniable being.

The self is the first person *I*. The *I* is not unmeanable nor is it meant—meant even as unmeanable. It is not unmeanable in the sense that it presents no problem in meaning at all and can be said to be neither meanable nor unmeanable. Meaning is the thinnest presentation of the object, as existing apart from introspection. *I* has no meaning in this sense: it has not even the meaning of being unmeant or unmeanable, which feeling in its two stages may be supposed to have. The word *I* is used by the speaker not for what is distinct but for what is only being distinguished by him; and it is not understood by the hearer to *mean* a distinct content. No two persons would use the word *I* of the same thing; but the speaker and the

hearer must be agreed about a meaning. Yet if a person understand me when I call myself *I*, though he does not use the word himself about me, it is—it may be contended—because of the meaning of the word. But in that case it would be a kind of general term meaning any speaker, in which sense however it is not used, not being applied to more than one thing at a time. The term in fact is not singular in the sense that different people use it of the same thing and not general in the sense that it is *understood* by any one of different things at a time. If a person using the word *I* is understood as referring to himself by another, it is not because the latter means the speaker by the word and would use the word to refer to the speaker. Thus it may be said that a speaker calling himself *I* is understood through the word but not through the meaning of the word. The word here has a meaning function but not a mean-

ing : it is the expression of introspection or what may be called the *I*-function.

Like the word *unmeanable*, the word *I* illustrates a use of language other than for purposes of thinking, the former being still the expression of an inability to think while the latter has not even this negative reference to thought. The meaning function of the word *I* is to the speaker his actual introspection but the understanding of the word by the hearer is indicative of a form of consciousness subtler than introspection. It is the awareness of how the speaker would introspect, awareness of a possible introspection.

IX. Beyond Introspection.

The realisation of what a speaker means by the word *I* is the hearer's awareness of a possible introspection. Such awareness is as much knowledge as actual introspection. The speaker calls himself *I* and may be understood by the hearer as *you*. As thus understood, the introspective self is individual, not an individual being—for introspection is not a subjective *being* like feeling—but the function of addressing to another self. The speaker does not understand himself through the meaning of the word *I*: his introspection is through the word and not through its meaning and is less a self-knowing than a self-revealing, revealing to a possible understander of the word *I*. Yet as the addressing attitude is only implicit, it is to him accidental and posterior to his self-knowing. To the understanding self however, although he understands the speaker's self-knowing because he is him-

self self-knowing, his understanding of the other I is primary while his own self-knowing is accidental and secondary. The speaker knows himself in implicitly revealing to the hearer and the hearer knows the speaker in implicitly knowing himself. Neither self-knowing nor other-knowing is through thinking or the meaning of the word and both might be called intuition in this negative sense. There are thus two cases—self-intuition with other-intuition implicit in it and other intuition with self-intuition implicit in it. Both are actual knowledge implying the use other than the thinking use of a word like *I*, which is like a pointing gesture at once self-evidencing and self-evident. My self-consciousness is not the understanding of the meaning of the word *I*: the word only reveals it to another. His understanding of the word as referring to me is not the understanding of it in the sense he would use it himself. The word has

no meaning either to him or to me and yet it stands like any other word for the same thing to both. This *standing for* is not only not meaning but not also mere symbolising. It is on the one hand revealing and on the other an accomplished revelation, at once self-evidencing and self-evident. The word may be said at once to symbolise and to be symbolised by my introspective self. The hearer takes it to symbolise myself but I, the speaker, symbolise it by myself or in a sense explained before, incarnate myself in it. The reference of the word *I* varies with the user of it: its meaning function is through his self-consciousness, is symbolised by his meaning function which is what he is primarily aware of, the symbol being better known than what is symbolised by it. Because the word *I* is at once the symbol and the symbolised, it cannot be said to have simply the symbolising function. It is this characteristic value of a word other than the meaning value or

merely symbolising value that indicates a grade of self-consciousness higher than our actual introspection.

Actual introspection is implicitly social, being a speaking or addressing or self-evidencing to another possible introspection or self to which its conscious solitariness or self-identity is evident. The evidencing and the evidentness are actual to different selves, speaker or hearer. The evidentness as to the hearer is however only a possible evidentness to the speaker. Actual introspection is unrealised knowledge because it is actually only self-evidencing to another and not self-evident to itself. One's own self should be self-evident, should be intuited by oneself even as it is intuited by another. The introspection that is actually reached by the annulment of the alien character of feeling as subjective being is, as already shown, only a speaking, self-evidencing or self-revealing, a function in the Kantian sense though not thinking function, a kind of transcen-

dental willing which is not known by the introspector but should be known as it is already known by another self. The self should be at once self-evidencing and self-evident but so far as we have only the self as self-evidencing and evident to another.

The other self is to the self-evidencing self a possible introspector whose intuition of the latter again is a possible intuition to the latter. It is because the actual introspector is thus aware of the possible introspector that he can conceive a possible introspection of his own beyond his actual introspection; and it is only as he is thus aware of a possibly intuited subjectivity that he can understand the possibility of a subjective illusion. The awareness of these possibles in oneself—possible knowledge and possible illusion of subjectivity—indicates the necessity of a spiritual discipline of realisation, realisation of the knowledge of the self already implied by introspection.

Introspection into a possible or non-existent mental state is or involves understanding of a word meaning the mental state. To mean a mental state is not to think it: it is either to feel the want of it or to give it a distinction which it has not, which is like creating it. Where the mental state is not present, to mean it is to remember it, to want it or to dreamily wish it. All these are forms of awareness of a possible mental state and may be regarded as a stage of introspection prior to the introspection into an actual mental state. If it is introspection, it cannot be said to be completely dissociated yet from subjective being and as such it is capable of being itself introspected into. There can be, for example, introspection into the conscious want of a feeling.

The want of a feeling is an actual feeling and introspection into it, as into any feeling, means its identification with the introspection. It does not how-

ever mean identification with itself of the feeling that is wanted. The introspector is not aware of such a feeling as his feeling: the possible feeling is an unappropriated feeling. The introspective awareness of an unappropriated subjective state is like the awareness of another self having it. To the introspector it is the awareness of what he himself *might* appropriate. There may be actual knowledge, as immediate as introspection and standing on a level with it, of another self and his subjective state. But as the introspector only imagines and does not know his own being, his awareness of his possible subjective state is not actual knowledge. Introspection into the awareness of a possible subjective state is thus possible or imaginary introspection. Such introspection is half-dissociated from the actually introspective self, half-dissociated in the sense that we only cannot deny it to be *our* introspection. It is indeed completely dissociated from the possible subjective

state but not from the actual awareness of it. Complete dissociation from this actual awareness is reached when the content of it is a subjective state that is illusory and not merely absent or possible.

There are illusions about the subjective just as there are illusions about the objective. A subjective state appears illusory to later introspection into the subjective state that supersedes it through, it may be, the effervescence of interest or other subtle subjective cause. But a simple form of subjective illusion may be presented in connexion with an objective illusion. When the objective presentation with which a psychic fact is bound up turns out to be illusory, there is at least a partial reduction of the psychic fact to illusion. In the example of the correction of the presentation of snake into the presentation of *this* rope, the fear as of *that* snake—that individual fear—is, as pointed out before, also felt to be, if not illusory, at least incapable of being

asserted as a past fact. We cannot say that we feared *that* snake if we now know that the snake never was. Some feeling bound up with the bodily reaction was indeed felt but *that* feeling of fear or fear of *that* snake was never felt. The specific character of the feeling bound up with the past belief in the snake cannot be said to have existed. Introspection now not only does not identify *that* feeling with itself: it rejects it as what it cannot possibly appropriate. There is a doubt, if not a denial, of possible appropriation of it by any individual self, of its being knowable by any introspection and yet it is introspection itself that denies the possibility.

Introspection is the awareness of a subjective fact as owing its facthood to itself and is in this sense the identification or appropriation of it. Such subjective fact may be itself the awareness of the absence or possibility of another subjective fact and introspection into it is the

awareness of this other fact as not actually appropriated but as possibly appropriated by another introspection. The subjective fact introspected into may be again the awareness of the impossibility of a subjective mode previously taken to be fact. Introspection here would be the awareness of this mode as beyond all possible introspective appropriation. One gets here the hint of an introspection that is not appropriative, of the appropriative function being accidental to the introspective self, of the distinctness or exclusiveness of *I* being an eliminable feature, of an intuitable self-identity that has not any subjective fact distinct from it to identify. Introspection that is not appropriation would be self-intuition, the *I* that is evident to itself and not merely to another, that does not like the individual *I* create a distinct subjective mode by distinguishing to resume it by identifying and proclaim this resumption again by speaking in the first person to another possible

person. The possibility of such a silent self-enjoying *I* is intelligible only because we are aware of certain subjective modes previously appropriated as not only now unappropriated but as utterly unappropriable and as accordingly appearing only *as though* they were distinct. The absolute intuitable self is only understood if the non-being of distinction is understood. Objective illusion is still a meant unmeasurable, meant and therefore distinguished. But subjective illusion is not even meant as unmeasurable. Introspection too is an unmeant meaning function; it is not known as distinct nor is it primarily so much a distinguishing as an identifying so far as it is knowledge. It is however still a distinguishing in the act of self-revealing and therefore also a distinguishing from itself as possible. The awareness of subjective illusion goes beyond introspection, being the explicit awareness of illusorily distinguishing, of *creating* a distinction that is no fact at all. The non-being of

distinction is finally understood here and hence too the conception of the absolute self.

X. The Subject As Freedom.

The subject is understood as what intends itself by the word *I*. The subject that intends is other than the subject that understands, being self-evident as self-evidencing to another and not to itself. The intuited subject is not only revealed but revealing: it is directly known as self-expressing in the spoken word *I* without being meant by it. It does not however intuit itself, as the intuiting subject also does not reveal itself. There is no introspective awareness of being revealed or incarnated in the word *I*, of one's freedom to self-expression as itself an evident fact. There is at best an imaginative demand for such awareness, for the realisation of the felt identification with the word (or the object) as presupposing dissociation from it, for the transformation of the felt freedom into the intuition of freedom. It is in introspection that we are aware of this demand for the consumma-

tion of the freedom that is felt in every grade of subjectivity in respect of the object presented to it. The object appears alien to the subject up to the stage of thought. The feeling subject is free from the thought or meant content in so far as the latter is reduced to a symbolism. But it is still subject having being, subject that can still be object to introspection, being free but not freedom itself. The introspective subject is indeed free from this being or possible objectivity and is thus freedom itself but it is still a distinct individual though only unconsciously. It knows itself not as *itself* but as a distinct subject that is only possibly identical with itself. It is thus aware of a demand to know this subject as actually itself, to annul its possible distinction from itself and therefore also its actual distinctness through the word *I*. The demand is for the intuition of the subject as absolute freedom.

The introspective self is aware of itself

as the psychic self and the bodily self. At all stages it knows itself as to be known. It knows the bodily self indeed as known not only as object but also as definitely separated from other objects. But it does not know it like other objects as having a space-position and is aware of the demand to realise its positionless objectivity. The psychic self is also known as identified with objectivity as pure form or pure meaning but it is only felt as dissociated from the perceived body; and in introspection we are aware of the demand to realise this felt dissociation in knowledge. The introspective self is unaware of being objective to itself though it understands another self calling itself *I* and thus knows it as having objective distinctness, the distinctness of the word *I*. As however itself revealing through the word to another self, it is aware of itself as a possibly understood distinct entity. It knows itself not as known like the psychic or bodily self but as only to be

known. As to be known, it is understood as what is only symbolised as distinct like the word *I* and what would lose its distinctness in being actually known. The subject is understood as freedom that is real and is characterisable by no objective category, not even by the category of distinctness. As we do not in introspection cease to be the bodily self which alone is actually evident to us, the subject that is absolutely unobjective or is freedom itself is to us only a possibility to be realised. The idea of realising the subject arises only because we are actually identified with the body while we are introspectively aware of ourselves as not objective and yet as definitely positive. Introspective awareness of oneself is awareness of the subject as not only not objective in the sense of being thought or meant but also as what cannot be said to have the being of feeling nor to be contradictory like the feeling of the want of a feeling nor even to be distinct like

the subject to which it reveals itself. At the same time it is not awareness of a mere negation or of an indefinite. This definite positive cannot be said to be not known though as actually undissociated from the object, we cannot assert it to be known. We are only aware of not being dissociated, being dissociated to the extent implied by such awareness. Such implied dissociation is possible freedom that is to be realised as evident.

The consciousness of not being actually dissociated is present even in the stage of bodily subjectivity where alone actual dissociation is known in some measure and not merely felt as in higher stages. It is known, as has been pointed out, as the perceived separation in space of the body from the outside object, though there is a feeling still of one's body not being perceived in a space-position, all position being relative to it. In higher stages, there is no knowledge of freedom from the object but only a feeling of it, the feeling

so far as it falls short of knowledge being the implicit awareness of not being actually free from the object. The higher the stage of subjectivity, the less is the freedom felt to be achieved though the more assured is the faith in its achievability. In the introspective stage, the feeling of achieved freedom lapses altogether, since it is here that the possibility of freedom is first definitely known. The faith in its achievability however is completely assured in this stage and takes the form of a conscious spiritual demand for the intuition of freedom as evident.

Three broad stages of subjectivity have been exhibited—the bodily, the psychical and the spiritual. In the bodily stage, three substages have been discussed—the body as externally perceived, the body as internally perceived or felt, and the absence of object known as a present fact. As externally perceived, the bodily subject is the centre of the perceived world but is not itself perceived as in it. As felt,

it is definitely known to be not in this world though it is not known as not the externally perceived body. The subject that imaginatively perceives the absence of an object is also like the felt body not consciously dissociated from the perceived body but the subject that knows absence through conscious non-perception is consciously dissociated from it. He feels himself unlike the felt body as definitely without reference to space-position and as only the time-position—present or *now*, as distinct from the image of the absent object, which also is without this reference but is not consciously felt as *now*.

The image of the object whose absence is known in conscious non-perception marks the transition to the psychic stage. It appears as the object that is absent and is not yet felt to be dissociated from it. The psychic stage begins when attention is shifted from the objective fact of absence to the image. As attended to, the image appears as imaging or the

forming of a form, the process and the product being presented at once. The consciousness of the form as evident in the forming process and as a product that does not yet come in time *after* it is the idea as undissociated from the image. A later stage is the idea as dissociated from the image, or pictorial thought which wants to be imaged and is definite so far as it is imaged. Non-pictorial thought comes next, thought that is definite in itself and has properly no image though an image may serve as its metaphor or symbol. These grades of image and thought are the grades of presentation which is explicitly felt to be dissociated from the object. Such dissociated presentation is known in introspection to have no space-position and is at least not known to have time-position. The image still appears however as though it had spatial form and to be forming as though it were a temporal process. Some trace of this quasi-temporal process may persist in

thought but thought as a non-pictorial meaning is felt to be free from it and to be eternally complete. Still such meaning appears as though it were object, being introspectively believed like other psychical facts to exist outside introspection. Its presentational character is explicitly indicated by the consciousness of the absence of accomplished meaning in what we have called *trying* to think which may be taken as pointing to the positive freedom from objective meaning such as characterises the non-presentational or spiritual stage of subjectivity.

The positive freedom from objectivity appears in the first instance as feeling. Feeling still seems to mean something but the meaning here so far as it is formulated is avowedly a symbolism for it only. To introspection indeed, feeling appears to be object but not as what may exist outside introspection. Its alien character is to introspection only apparent, being dis-

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tinct only through introspection and not capable of existing outside introspection except as illusorily bound up with a presentation. The feeling subject has a being to introspection so that it is free and is not freedom itself. The next stage is the feeling of wanting a feeling, which is in fact a felt contradiction or self-negation that still appears distinct from the introspection into it. The introspecting subject however is not introspected into and is self-revealing through the word *I*. It is aware of being revealed or evident not to itself but to the subject addressed and therefore of being *possibly* revealed to itself also. As thus only possibly evident to itself, it is unappropriated by itself while as introspecting, it is aware of addressing a subject and of being dissociated from it by the very fact of addressing. It thus feels being distinct but does know itself as distinct. It is aware of the subject as possibly free from distinctness, as its very self but not as

exclusively its own.

I am introspectively conscious of my body as subject but not as not mine or the appropriated. I am conscious of a psychic fact as not mine, as subject that is not however not *me* as the known. As however I speak of *I* in introspection, I intend what before I spoke was not *me* but not what was not a distinct *I*. There is no introspection into introspection but just as perception is known indirectly in introspection into some other subjective state like memory, so introspection is known indirectly in introspection into feeling. Feeling appears to introspection as subject that has no reference to object, as I but still as I distinct from I, as the be-ent I illusorily distinct from the introspective I. Introspection into the feeling I then is awareness of the introspecting I as not distinguished but as only distinguished *from*, as that from which being and non-being are both distinguished, as that which cannot be denied to be

distinct in itself but of which such distinction is not known,

The apprehension of I as not even distinct in itself is indicated by the consciousness of subjective illusion, of a mode of subjectivity that is not only unappropriated but unappropriable. There is occasion to correct the conceit not only of *my* body and of *me* as a presentation, not only of I as felt being but also of I as an actual distinct introspector. The introspecting self that I am indirectly aware of in introspection into feeling appears to be an actual self. In introspection into the feeling of wanting a feeling it turns out to be only a possible self that is still distinct as an introspector. But there may be the consciousness of a feeling being illusorily wanted: I may for example recognise not only that I am not religious but also that even my hankering after religion is not real but only a sentimental makebelieve. Such recognition would be the awareness not

only of an unappropriated but of an unappropriable religious aspiration, of the self that only appears as I aspiring and *is not it*, is not an actual introspector and not even a possible introspector.

I am never positively conscious of my present individuality, being conscious of it only as what is or can be outgrown, only as I feel freeing myself from it and am free to the extent implied by such feeling. I do not know myself as free but I conceive that I can be free successively as body from the perceived object, as presentation from the body, as feeling from presentation and as introspective function from feeling. I am not introspectively aware of my actual introspective individuality but I am aware in my introspection into feeling that the self from which the feeling is distinguished may not actually introspect and may not even possibly introspect, that individual as it is as introspecting—individual or distinct freedom without being, it may be free even

from this distinctness, may be freedom itself that is de-individualised but not therefore indefinite—absolute freedom that is to be evident.





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